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ZONING LAW IN ARKANSAS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS
By Robert R. Wright*
Out of the Old Fields must spring and grow new Corn.
- Sir Edward Coke, preface, 1 Rep. (1600)
I.
INTRODUCTION
The law of zoning in Arkansas is an emerging, still developing
field. By comparison to more populous states with larger and more
numerous urban areas, the Arkansas courts have decided relatively
few zoning cases. The judicial process in Arkansas zoning law has
been characterized by some inconsistency and, until recent years,
by an apparent lack of substantial understanding of this area of
the law by lawyers and judges alike. It is sometimes difficult to find
a clear pattern in the Arkansas cases, although some of the more
recent cases illustrate an emerging direction and an increasing un-
derstanding of the problem.1 If this trend continues, it would re-
present a welcome departure from the repeated utterance of an-
cient nostrums, such as that "zoning is in derogation of the
common law" and thus is to be strictly construed.2 To the con-
* B.A., University of Arkansas; M.A., Duke University; J.D., University of Arkansas;
S.J.D., University of Wisconsin. Donaghey Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock. The author wishes to acknowledge research performed for him,
relative to Arkansas law, by Gregory T. Karber, a former student, who is now practicing law
in Fort Smith.
1. Examples of this trend include City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584
S.W.2d 10 (1979); Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979); City of
Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 547 S.W.2d 94 (1977); Baldridge v. City of North
Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975); Lindsey v. City of Fayetteville, 256 Ark.
352, 507 S.W.2d 101 (1974); Fields v. City of Little Rock, 251 Ark. 811, 475 S.W.2d 509
(1972); and City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921 (1966).
2. Whenever the Arkansas Supreme Court is in the process of invalidating the use of
the police power through zoning, and sometimes when it is not, it will almost invariably
make this recitation. See, e.g., Blundell v. City of West Helena, 258 Ark. 123, 522 S.W.2d
661 (1975); W.C. McMinn Co. v. City of Little Rock, 257 Ark. 442, 516 S.W.2d 584 (1974);
City of Little Rock v. Andres, 237 Ark. 658, 375 S.W.2d 370 (1964); City of West Helena v.
Bockman, 221 Ark. 677, 256 S.W.2d 40 (1953); City of Little Rock v. Williams, 206 Ark. 861,
177 S.W.2d 924 (1944).
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trary, zoning is predicated on the police power, which was recog-
nized by Blackstone,3 and the Arkansas General Assembly has pro-
vided that its enabling statute is to be liberally construed.4 On the
other hand, it may correctly be said to be in derogation of the com-
mon law in the sense that it did not come to us from the common
law of England, but rather by way of the civil law of European
countries. 5 This was also true of American condominium statutes.6
The first comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United States
was adopted by New York City in 1916. The landmark decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.8
upheld comprehensive zoning approximately a decade later. Prior
to Euclid numerous cities and towns had adopted ordinances
which regulated land use and, in fact, this process can be traced
back to colonial times9 and before that to acts of Parliament'0 and
3. Blackstone wrote that the law had such a high regard for private property "that it
will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole
community." 1 W. BLACKSrOz, ComawrARmS 139 (London 1783). But he was speaking of
the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property "without any control or diminution, save
only by the laws of the land." Id. at 138 (emphasis added). The "laws of the land" include
the police power.
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2831 (1980).
5. J. METzENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 12 (2d ed. 1955) attributed the use of zoning to a
decree by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1810, also pointing out that a Prussian Code of several
decades later was a more comprehensive and sophisticated development of the device. An-
other writer refers to the laws of the German empire in 1884.. 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING AND LAW
AND PRACTICE 4 (4th ed. 1978). However, he also refers to Napoleon.
To the contrary of the foregoing, one American writer stated that zoning regulations
had been in effect in the United States since colonial times. Solberg, "Rural Zoning in the
United States," Information Bulletin 59, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (1959).
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1001 to -1025 (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1979), which went into
effect on September 14, 1961, was the first condominium statute to be adopted oi the Amer-
ican mainland. It was largely a translation into common law terms of the Puerto Rican
statute which was of civil law origin. See generally R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 87-98
(1968).
7. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AmERIcAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.07 (2d ed. 1976). The ordinance
was held to be valid in Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E.
209 (1920).
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. See, e.g., Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 1692-1693, ch. 23,
which sets forth an act designed to prevent nuisances arising from slaughterhouses, tallow
chandlers, curriers and other types of odiferous activities. See also Acts and Resolves of the
Province of Massachusetts Bay 1739-1740, for an act attempting to keep horses, cattle,
sheep and swine from running at large and people from setting fires on an island in Ipswich
Bay called Plumb Island.
10. The Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2 sought enlargement of high-
ways leading from one market town to another through the clearance of trees, bushes and
underbrush along each side so that no man could "lurk to do hurt" to travelers. An act in
the time of Queen Elizabeth I controlled the cutting of wood for non-domestic purposes
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even back to the Romans." At least two pre-Euclid Arkansas ordi-
nances regulating land use were approved by the United States Su-
preme Court.'2 These early controls on land use were sustained
under the police power with the courts often drawing an analogy to
the law of nuisance.' s
The nuisance analogy is an easy one to utilize. The basis of the
law of nuisance is the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
meaning that no one may use his land in such a way as to interfere
with the rights of his neighbor. 4 Thus, if a city ordinance banned
livery stables or the tanning of hides from normal commercial en-
virons, even though the ordinance was enacted under the police
power, it was easy to sustain by analogy to nuisance doctrine.'8 In
essence the city was saying that such operations constituted a pub-
lic nuisance to other non-odiferous businesses in the area. Public
health was promoted in that the odors produced and the flies, in-
sects, bugs, or rodents attracted by such operations were
eliminated.
This analogy carried over into the early zoning cases, including
Euclid. Its application there, however, was in fact more questiona-
ble and certainly more subtle. The town of Euclid's ordinance was
a comprehensive one which classified all of the property in the city
into several overlapping use, height, and area districts. The nui-
within certain areas around London. 1581, 23 Eliz., c. 5. After the Great Fire, an act provid-
ing for the rebuilding of London established certain building controls designed to prevent a
reoccurrence. 1666, 19 Car. 2, c. 3.
11. The Twelve Tables, drafted by a Commission in 451-450 B.C., represented the
earliest code of Roman law. One provision provides for setback lines from walls, wells, trees,
and neighboring property. See TAsuitmv oF LAw 71 (R. Nice ed. 1964).
12. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (involving an ordinance regu-
lating the location of livery stables) and Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498
(1919) (involving regulation of gasoline storage facilities). See generally D. HAGMAN, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 69 (1971).
13. In Reinman, for example, it was argued that a livery stable is not a nuisance per
se. The Court stated: "Granting that it is not a nuisance per se, it is clearly within the police
power of the state to regulate the business, and to that end to declare that in particular
circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact
and in law, provided this power is not exerted arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimina-
tion .. " 237 U.S. at 176. See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (pertain-
ing to brick yards or brick kilns).
14. The maxim is well-expressed in Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div.
37, 39, 258 N.Y.S. 229, 231 (1932). See also Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161
Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911). English legal scholars as early as Britton, who wrote around
1300 A.D., expressed the basic rule. 1 BRrrroN 140b, 56 (F. Nichols ed. 1901).
15. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); City of Fort Smith v. Western
Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724 (1922).
1980]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
sance doctrine was employed in a rather peculiar way. Justice
Sutherland, writing for the Court, felt that comprehensive zoning
was justified because it resulted in preserving property values and
particularly served to protect single-family homes. In language
which appears curiously archaic at the present time, he referred to
the nuisance of apartment houses encroaching into single-family
neighborhoods. 1 These were values which the city had the right to
protect under its police power.
The Euclid case did not give carte blanche authority to zon-
ing, as was illustrated shortly thereafter in Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge. 7 But it did approve a comprehensive zoning ordinance and
the basic validity of comprehensive zoning. As such, it settled the
question with regard to states which had adopted seemingly differ-
ing views.18
"Euclidian" or "Euclidean" zoning, as it has come to be called,
was not a perfect tool by any means. The nature of it in terms of
use districts may be likened to a pyramid. At the apex is the sin-
gle-family residential district-the highest and most protected use.
The pyramid broadens as you proceed toward the base because
higher uses are permissible under traditional Euclidian zoning in
lower use districts. The zoning is thus cumulative in nature and
can produce problems in terms of nuisance litigation.19 Non-cumu-
lative zoning, utilizing the conditional use device, is more typical of
modern ordinances including the recently enacted Little Rock Zon-
ing Ordinance. 0
Another problem with pure Euclidian-type zoning is its rigid-
ity. Eventually, such devices as cluster zoning and the planned unit
development, which are subsequently discussed, were employed to
ameliorate the problem. These were preceded by the so-called
"floating zone," which does not appear to have gained widespread
16. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
17. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). This case declared a zoning ordinance to be unreasonable and
thus unconstitutional as it applied to a particular tract of land. It provided the basic ratio-
nale for most future attacks on the application of zoning ordinances.
18. Compare State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923) with
Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 A. 50 (1925).
19. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932), in-
volved a situation in which a plaintiff "moved to the nuisance" by constructing a residence
in an industrial area. She was denied relief. Although this was not a zoning case, cumulative
zoning would have permitted such higher uses to be constructed in incompatible surround-
ings and thereby spawn nuisance litigation.
20. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 13,777 (Dec. 18, 1979).
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acceptance possibly due in part to the legal question of whether it
amounts to a somewhat more sophisticated form of spot zoning.
In the evolution of zoning law in the United States, the basic
problem which usually was litigated was whether the zoning was
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable or was within the police
power of the municipality. If the police power exceeded its reason-
able limits in a particular ordinance or if the result of its applica-
tion were such as to amount to a deprivation of the reasonable use
of a particular land parcel, then such actions were invalid because
they were confiscatory in nature and amounted to a taking of prop-
erty without just compensation. In more recent years other consti-
tutional issues have arisen which translate civil rights issues into
land use considerations. These more recent issues revolve around
the essentially exclusionary nature of zoning.
This discussion, while pertaining largely to Arkansas zoning
law, will fill in some of the gaps through reference to decisions in
other jurisdictions and will compare and contrast the approach
taken in the various Arkansas cases to decisions from other
jurisdictions.
II. THE ENABLING STATUTE
No municipality may exercise its zoning powers without en-
abling authority of some kind.2 1 While this could result from a con-
stitutional provision or broad home rule authority, it customarily
results from state enabling legislation permitting local govern-
ments to exercise such authority.2 2 Such is the situation in
Arkansas.'3
More than a century ago, Arkansas granted police power au-
thority to municipal corporations to regulate the construction and
repair of buildings primarily for purposes of fire prevention.24 The
authority of the cities with regard to buildings was expanded in
1907, 2 but it was not until 1924 that zoning regulations of more
21. See generally J. BEuscHER, R. WRIGHT & M. GITELMAN, LAND USE 530 (2d ed.
1976). More specifically, see State ex rel. State v. Schwartz, 336 Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63
(1935).
22. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 80 (1971); R.
WRIGHT & S. WEBBER, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 113 (1978).
23. ARK. STAT ANN. §§ 19-2801 to -2833 (1980).
24. Id. § 19-2801.
25. Id. §§ 19-2802 to -2803.
19801
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typical and modern vintage were permitted by statute. 6 These
early provisions are viewed as superseded in cities establishing
planning commissions under the current enabling act." Since it is
clear under the current statutes and under case authority that
planning and the development of a comprehensive plan must pre-
cede the enactment of any valid zoning ordinance in Arkansas,18
these older statutes are of limited importance today. However, the
first section of the 1924 enabling act is of particular interest be-
cause it "recognized and hereby declared that the beauty of sur-
roundings constitutes a valuable property right which should be
protected by law, and that this is particularly true of residential
sections."' The prevailing rule in the United States today is that
zoning for the purpose of achieving aesthetic benefits must be ac-
companied by some other valid police power consideration such as
the advancement and preservation of health or safety.30 This old
and unrepealed Arkansas statute suggests that Arkansas in 1924
adopted a modern approach, followed at the present time by only a
handful of states, 1 which would permit zoning to be exercised to
promote aesthetic purposes only. The Arkansas cases, however,
suggest otherwise.32
26. Id. §§ 19-2804 to -2807.
27. See the note to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2804 (1980).
28. City of Searcy v. Roberson, 224 Ark. 344, 273 S.W.2d 26 (1954). Related to this
holding are Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979) and City of
Coming v. Watson, 252 Ark. 1277, 482 S.W.2d 797 (1972).
29. Anx STAT. ANN. § 19-2804 (1980).
30. For a good discussion, see Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz,
Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland,
269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955); and Note, Aesthetic Zoning: A Current Evaluation of
the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. Rsv. 430 (1965).
31. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), in dictum by Justice William 0. Douglas,
made a strong case for the validity of using the police power for aesthetic purposes only.
The case is viewed as controlling in the District of Columbia. The Berman case led Wiscon-
sin to go to the brink of zoning for aesthetics only in State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), but it stopped short of doing so. New
York embraced aesthetic zoning in People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240
N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963), and reinforced its rule in Cromwell v.
Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). Oregon upheld zoning solely
for aesthetic purposes in Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965). Hawaii,
relying on a constitutional provision, did the same in State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50
Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967). Aesthetic considerations seem to underlie other decisions to
the point that valid distinctions are rendered quite difficult, for example, City of St. Paul v.
Chicago, St. P., Minn. & 0. Ry. Co., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985
(1969). The ambivalence is particularly apparent in United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of
Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1964).
32. Although the Florida note writer, supra note 30, cites Arkansas as one of the states
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The enabling legislation which in general regulates exercise of
zoning powers today is Act 186 of 1957.38 This statute begins with
a desirable requirement in that it is geared first and foremost to
planning, thus recognizing that zoning is in fact only a tool to be
exercised as a part of the overall planning process-a recognition
that, unfortunately, is too often sadly missing during the active
stages of the zoning or rezoning process. The Act states that cities
and incorporated towns are empowered to adopt and enforce plans
"for the coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the
municipality and its environs."'" The plan or plans would provide
for the development process and would be intended to serve tradi-
tional police power considerations. To carry out the plan, a plan-
ning commission would be established. The Commission would
prepare plans, make recommendations on development, prepare
regulations, prepare ordinances for the city legislative body to pass
to implement the plan, and generally advise the city government.
Comprehensive studies, planning area maps, and various types of
plans are authorized. All public development would have to be ap-
proved by the planning commission. Private developments would
have to take place pursuant to and not in violation of the various
plans and particularly in accord with the master street plan, al-
though limitations are provided in order to eliminate the possibil-
ity that this might constitute a taking."' Other provisions call for
the carrying on of studies and the preparation of a land use plan,
community facilities plan, a master street plan, and other plans in
general.36 These plans are to be implemented primarily through
the zoning ordinance regulating such things as the location, height,
bulk, density, and size of buildings, open space, lot coverage, popu-
lation density, land uses, off-street parking, and the like.37 A board
of zoning adjustment is given the power to grant variances and
hear administrative appeals, although its variance power is limited
which to some extent views aesthetics as a sufficient consideration to constitute a basis for
zoning (but which has chosen to buttress the argument through traditional police power
considerations), it may be fairly said that the majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court de-
molished the basis for this contention in City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148,
547 S.W.2d 94 (1977). Arkansas has never judicially approved zoning predicated solely upon
aesthetics.
33. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2825 to -2831 (1980).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 19-2827.
36. Id. § 19-2828.
37. Id. § 19-2829.
1980]
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to area variances and is not extended to use variances.8 The plan-
ning commission is also given extensive power over subdivision de-
velopment.3e Procedures are provided for the adoption of plans, or-
dinances, and regulations, which involve notice and a public
hearing.40
Unfortunately, the original authority permitting cities to exer-
cise extraterritorial zoning power41 was repealed by Act 379 of
19694" except with regard to land lying along a navigable waterway
within five miles of the corporate limits and within two miles later-
ally from the "thread" of the stream. This has led to the inability
of Arkansas cities to cope effectively with the development of non-
conforming uses in adjoining land which will shortly or ultimately
be annexed. The result is that an annexation brings with it land
use problems that should not exist and that impinge upon sound
planning and zoning principles. Act 379 of 1969 was probably the
most damaging land use regulation ever passed by the General
Assembly.
48
III. THE LEGAL PARAMETERS OF ZONING
Authorities have for many years wrestled with the question of
when the police power is exceeded to the point that it may be
viewed either as an improper exercise of the power or as being so
limiting as to constitute a taking of private property without just
compensation." Zoning classifications or the failure to rezone are
usually invalidated on the basis that the action taken or the failure
38. Id. § 19-2829(b)(2), which states: "The board of zoning adjustment shall not per-
mit, as a variance, any use in a zone that is not permitted under the ordinance."
39. Id. § 19-2829(c).
40. Id. § 19-2830.
41. Id. § 19-2827(1).
42. Id. § 19-2804.1. This Act prohibits cities and towns from prescribing or fixing "any
zoning control or zoning authority over the use of lands lying outside the corporate limits of
such city or town." This is somewhat confusing in that Section (1) of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-
2827 remains as a part of the statutes. What it seems to boil down to, as indicated by AK.
STAT. ANN. § 19-2804.3, is that a municipality may "plan" with regard to extraterritorial
land but may not implement its planning through zoning. Its planning is thereby rendered
of little value, with the exception of planning and zoning in "territory lying along a naviga-
ble stream for a distance of five (5) miles of the corporate limits" and "two (2) miles later-
ally from the thread of the stream." Id. § 19-2804.2.
43. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2804.1 (1980).
44. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for In-
verse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1 (1971); and Sax, Takings, Private Prop-
erty and Public Rights, 81 YAIz L.J. 149 (1971).
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to act constitutes arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable conduct
on the part of the municipality.45 But there is much confusion with
regard to these generalizations, and the confusion manifests itself
in inconsistency affected by personal predilections or tinged with
bias.
One prime illustration of this confusion is the preoccupation
with diminution of the value of a parcel of property as opposed to
the economic gain which might be realized through rezoning or the
granting of some form of administrative relief. Developers and
others associated with the real estate business seem to believe that
the zoning of a particular tract should conform to the "highest and
best use" of the parcel in question rather than to a comprehensive
plan for the area. This is not the law in the United States and is
patently absurd. When carried to its logical conclusion, it is the
antithesis of zoning because no comprehensive plan could survive
for very long in the face of such a thesis. It is also contrary to the
statutes."
This problem was enunciated by the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals in the following manner:
[After stating that zoning should be based on "a continuous or
periodic study of the development of property uses" and growth
trends which would lead to systematic and intelligent changes
based on a coordinated plan:] An examination of the multitude of
zoning cases that have reached this court leads us to the conclu-
sion that the common practice of zoning agencies, after the adop-
tion of an original ordinance, is simply to wait until some prop-
erty owner finds an opportunity to acquire a financial advantage
by devoting his property to a use other than that for which it is
zoned, and then struggle with the question of whether some ex-
cuse can be found for complying with his request for rezoning.
The result has been that in most of the rezoning cases reaching
the courts there actually has been spot zoning and the courts
have upheld or invalidated the change according to how flagrant
45. Higginbotham v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973); City of Conway v. Housing
Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979); Evans v. City of Little Rock, 221 Ark. 252, 253
S.W.2d 347 (1952); Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 1ll.2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975); Kropf v.
City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974); and see generally 1 R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.14 (2d ed. 1976).
46. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2828 to -2829 (1980). The latter statute provides in subsec-
tion (a) that after the plan or plans are adopted, the planning commission will submit rec-
ommended "ordinances and regulations which will carry out or protect the various elements
of the plan or plans." Id. § 19-2829(a). Subsection (c) relating to subdivisions requires "the
developer to conform to the plan or plans currently in effect." Id. § 19-2829(c).
19801 429
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the violation of true zoning principles has been. It is to be hoped
that in the future zoning authorities will give recognition to the
fact that an essential feature of zoning is planning.
47
Unfortunately, this represents an accurate description of the re-
zoning process in Arkansas and in the manifested attitudes of de-
velopers and property owners. Zoning to many of them is supposed
to be something subordinate to the desire to make money on a
piece of real estate. But on a national basis, case after case has
stated that the opportunity or desire of a landowner or developer
to gain financially through a rezoning or through administrative re-
lief is immaterial.48 The fact that the property might be worth
more if some lower use were permitted is of no consequence unless
the end result would be to render the property practically
worthless.'
Developers, realtors, and landowners do not subscribe very
often to this line of thought. In a recent case in Pulaski County,
"expert" testimony was produced to show that the "highest and
best use" of property in a predominantly residential area would be
for a quick service grocery and merchandise store. The argument
prevailed that the city had acted arbitrarily in refusing to permit
this use of this small parcel of land.50 It was duly noted during the
course of the trial that no neighbors objected-a matter which also
47. Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Ky. 1961). See also Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); and Chrobuck v. Snohomish
County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 872-73, 480 P.2d 489, 495-96 (1971). These latter cases manifest a
growing tendency not to accord the legislative presumption to actions of municipal bodies
relating to variances, conditional use permits, and single rezoning applications. These activi-
ties are viewed as basically administrative or quasi-judicial in nature.
48. E.g., In re Cresko, 400 Pa. 467, 162 A.2d 219, 222 (1960): "Business operators per-
sist in believing that a variance can be justified by an opportunity to make money, or con-
versely, that it is an abuse of discretion to deny them the opportunity." Or as the Illinois
Supreme Court expressed it: "Petitioner emphasizes the fact that its property would be
more valuable if zoned for commercial purposes, but this fact exists in every case where the
intensity with which property may be used is restricted by zoning laws." Evanston Best &
Co. v. Goodman, 369 Ill. 207, 211, 16 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1938). See also Fritts v. City of
Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1961).
49. Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975); Aronson v. Town
of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964); R-N-R Assocs. v. Zoning Bd. of Review,
100 R.I. 7, 210 A.2d 653 (1965).
50. The decision was affirmed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in City of Little Rock
v. Breeding, 270 Ark. 752, 606 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980) in a four to two decision. The
majority opinion does not reflect a considered understanding of this area of law. The minor-




is largely irrelevant, as has been ably discussed.5 1 The basic falsity,
however, of the "highest and best use" theory is that it has nothing
to do with zoning. It plays a vital role in allocating compensation
in an eminent domain proceeding and indeed forms the initial ba-
sis for determining the award.82 But it is of no relevance in most
zoning cases and should be inadmissible evidence except as it may
pertain incidentally to the "taking" issue."3
Certainly, if regulation of property goes too far, it will amount
to a taking which either serves to invalidate the regulation or re-
quire compensation. Moreover, the distinction between a valid po-
lice power regulation and the taking power under eminent domain
is a matter of degree which sometimes reconciles itself, depending
upon the particular shade of gray involved. But the validity of zon-
ing cannot be translated into a dollars and cents matter unless the
results of the restriction are dramatically apparent."
The Arkansas Supreme Court over the years has had only lim-
ited occasion to venture into these considerations. In one early
case, a zoning ordinance was invalidated where one factor was the
diminution in value from $20,000 to $8,000."5 In another case ap-
proving rezoning, the evidence showed that a residence would in-
crease in value from $12,000 to $25,000 if rezoned to permit com-
51. Gitelman, The Role of the Neighbors in Zoning Cases, 28 ARK. L. REV. 221 (1974).
52. See generally R. WRIGHT, ARKANSAS EMINENT DOMAIN DIGEST § 5.5E-2, (1964) and
the cases cited in that section. The rule is implicit in the UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE §
1007 (1974).
53. For example, the highest and best use of the land might be so far removed from
the zoning classification assigned to a parcel that the resultant diminution in value would be
so great as to amount to a taking. This would provide evidence demonstrating that the
zoning in question was arbitrary to the point of being confiscatory. On the "highest and best
use" argument, see Hyatt v. Zoning Bd., 163 Conn. 379, 311 A.2d 77 (1972); Montgomery
County Council v. Kacur, 253 Md. 220, 252 A.2d 832 (1969); Barone v. Township of Bridge-
water, 45 N.J. 224, 212 A.2d 129 (1965); 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.24 (2d
ed. 1976).
54. No firm line can be drawn. Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965), in which the zoning was invalidated in part on other grounds, involved a 75%
reduction in value of an 85 acre development. The Arkansas cases, see notes 55 & 56, infra,
involve even greater percentage reductions in value. But in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), the landmark zoning case, it was alleged that the market value of certain
property would be reduced from $10,000 per acre to $2,500 per acre by the zoning. The
Supreme Court approved the zoning anyway.
55. City of Little Rock v. Sun Bldg. & Developing Co., 199 Ark. 333, 134 S.W.2d 582
(1939). Other factors entering into the decision were that the lots had been platted for com-




mercial uses. 6 Apparently the Arkansas Supreme Court viewed the
value differential as sufficient in those cases to amount either to a
taking or proof of arbitrariness on the part of the city or both.57
On the other hand, the Arkansas Supreme Court has also
stated that rezoning is not justified by the mere fact that economic
gain would result to the owner of a limited land parcel.58 These are
more recent cases and are in accord with the undisputed view on
the subject.59 Moreover, such a situation would often constitute
spot zoning. Refusal to rezone a relatively small area, however, sug-
gests that if current zoning adversely affects a substantial area
such as an entire neighborhood, and if rezoning would enhance the
property value of the entire area, then rezoning would likely be in
order. Key factors which have to be considered include the ques-
tion of spot zoning, which will subsequently be discussed, and the
impact of the rezoning upon the comprehensive plan. If the rezon-
ing is contrary to the comprehensive plan for the area, then the
granting of the rezoning application would constitute spot zoning
unless so much of the area is affected that the plan itself is suspect
and warrants reevaluation and change. The trend of the Arkansas
cases appears to follow that line of reasoning,60 which means that
substantial progress has been made in the judicial consideration of
this area of the law.
The Taking Question
Much of law is involved with the problem of the advancement
56. City of Little Rock v. Gardner, 239 Ark. 54, 386 S.W.2d 923 (1965). The court also
stated in this case that one principal purpose of zoning is to "stabilize property values in a
neighborhood, thus encouraging the most appropriate use of the land." Id. at 58, 386 S.W.2d
at 925.
57. It is difficult to criticize these cases on the basis of the monetary differential in-
volved. The Gardner case might be criticized for not affirmatively pointing out that mere
economic gain, even though substantial, is not sufficient to justify rezoning, particularly
where the rezoning would violate the master plan for the neighborhood or area involved and
could result in ultimately changing or adversely affecting the character of land use in the
area or that contemplated for the area. This has been stated by the court in other cases
cited in note 58 infra.
58. Lindsey v. City of Fayetteville, 256 Ark. 352, 507 S.W.2d 101 (1974); Tate v. City
of Malvern, 246 Ark. 316, 438 S.W.2d 52 (1969).
59. Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975); In re Cresko, 400
Pa. 467, 162 A.2d 219 (1960); 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.27 (2d ed. 1976);
and see note 46 supra.
60. This is implicit in City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10
(1979); Taylor v. City of Little Rock, 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979); and Baldridge v.
City of North Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975).
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of the public interest without unduly impinging upon private
rights. It is a question of the corporate rights and interests of all of
us as opposed to the legal rights of any one of us. In the Greek
City State the citizen was subordinate to the interests of the pub-
lic. But Rome gave recognition to the rights which individuals
could claim against the State, and thus even St. Paul as a Roman
citizen was entitled to assert his right to a trial before Caesar.61
The rise of Christianity placed an increased emphasis on the value
of the individual in the eyes of God. These values translated them-
selves into the English common law and, particularly into equity,
influenced as it was by the ecclesiastics who were the first Chancel-
lors.62 The protection of individual rights, in certain limited sec-
tions of the Magna Carta,6" represented the lasting contribution of
that document and represented the theme of the English Bill of
Rights.4
The right to take private property for public use or for a pub-
lic purpose is an old and venerable rule. According to one leading
text, there are references to it in the Bible and it was recognized by
the Romans." The concept originated as an inherent right of the
sovereign and the constitutional provisions of the United States
and Arkansas Constitutions are limitations on an otherwise unlim-
ited power."e The Magna Carta placed a limitation on the power
but did not provide for payment of compensation. 7 Blackstone,
however, advocated compensation for takings, and many of the
early state constitutions as well as the fifth amendment required
compensation." Even prior to the application of the fifth amend-
ment to the states through the fourteenth amendment, states
whose constitutions did not require just compensation relied upon
the natural law, with the courts assuming the burden of requiring
61. The Acts of the Apostles 16:36-40, 25:7-11.
62. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HIsTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 139, 696-97 (5th ed. 1956).
63. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta (1215) provides that "No freeman shall be ...
disseised of any freehold... except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land." W. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA 316-17 (1965).
64. See id. at 96, 184.
65. 1 P. NICHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.2, .12 (1976).
66. Id. See also J. BEUSCHER & R. WRIGHT, LAND USE 709 (1969) and R. WRIGHT & S.
WEBBER, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 231 (1978).
67. R. WRIGHT & S. WEBBER, supra note 66, at 233. For an extensive discussion of the
background to the development of the law of eminent domain, see F. BossELMAN, D. CAL-
LIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING Issuz 51-123 (1973).
68. F. BoSSELMAN, D. CALLmS & J. BANTA, supra note 67, at 101-04.
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payment of compensation in eminent domain proceedings."
The evolution of the law of eminent domain led to the devel-
opment of the doctrine of "inverse condemnation" and its enlarge-
ment in more recent times. An inverse condemnation proceeding
involves an assertion by an individual that some public action has
resulted in a taking or damaging of his property without just com-
pensation. The proceedings are not eminent domain proceedings
initiated by the public agency but are proceedings by the land-
owner seeking compensation resulting from actions of that agency
amounting to a taking. Although there are different varieties of in-
verse condemnation actions,70 we are concerned here only with the
allegation that a zoning regulation which would otherwise be valid
under the police power is so restrictive or unreasonable that its
enforcement would amount to a taking. In the zoning situation, the
landowner is not seeking damages for an action already taken but
is seeking to invalidate the ordinance as it applies to him on the
principle that it is unenforceable without payment of just compen-
sation. Thus, abuse of the police power through its use in an arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable manner is akin to and is actually
a form of inverse condemnation because the result is to deprive a
property owner of rights which can only be impaired through emi-
nent domain proceedings.
There are no set rules, no litmus paper test, that can be ap-
plied to this problem. There is no precise identifiable point at
which the dividing line between a valid exercise of the police power
and a taking can be said to have been crossed. 1 What courts must
do is seek to identify criteria which may assist them in such
69. J. BauscHRR & R. WmORHT, supra note 66, at 710.
70. E.g., Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. McNeill, 238 Ark. 244, 381 S.W.2d 425
(1964) (involving damages allegedly resulting from a violation of restrictive covenants);
Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973)
(also involving restrictive covenants and holding contrary to the McNeill case); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (the landmark case allowing inverse condemnation
suits for damages resulting from invasion of airspace by low-flying aircraft); United States v.
Certain Parcels of Land in Kent County, Mich., 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (involv-
ing excessive highway noise); and Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100
(1962) (involving the taking of an easement for noise based on a nuisance theory, with the
noise emanating from aircraft taking off and landing at an airport). A more typical inverse
condemnation action than any of the foregoing would involve a situation in which a land-
owner alleged damage of some type from the construction of a new highway, but the damage
did not involve the actual taking of any of his land.
71. See Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse




Generally speaking, the courts have abandoned two extremes
which have been advanced periodically-one being that an individ-
ual's land may never be regulated under the police power or his
rights diminished without regard to the situation, 7  and the other
being that the public has an absolute right to regulate land use no
matter what the effect may be on a particular landowner.
78 Of
these extremes, neither of which has ever been given lip service by
the Arkansas Supreme Court, Arkansas has clearly tended more
toward protection of individual property rights.7 4 This may be con-
trasted with the approach of one group of scholars who advocate
that a land use regulation should never constitute a taking if it is
reasonably related to a valid public purpose.7 '
It is unlikely that either of these extremes will prevail in the
United States, although the trend as manifested in these recent
writings and in the Model Land Development Code seems more
toward the vesting of greater power in public regulatory agencies.7 6
At least part of this impetus seems to have resulted from environ-
mental concerns.7 7 Certainly no court today, outside of Arkansas,
would assert that "the right of private property is before and
higher than any constitutional sanction" (although the Arkansas
Supreme Court is only quoting an obsolete provision in the state
constitution).7  Probably no one with a gun in his ribs and a de-
mand for "your money or your life" would come forth with that
constitutional pronouncement. Even the late Jack Benny, a self-
styled skinflint, wanted time to think it over.
The current, highly generalized rule on when the police power
72. Blackstone did not advocate this, but his statement that private property cannot
be violated "no, not even for the general view of the whole community" is sometimes cited
to sustain this proposition. 1 W. BLAcKsToNz, CoMmKrAmsm 139 (1783). The Arkansas Con-
stitution might also be cited for this proposition since it states that "the right of property is
before and higher than any constitutional sanction." AnK. CONST. art. 2, § 22.
73. F. BossnL~mA, D. CALLms & J. BANTA, TH TAKING Issuz 238 (1973) argue that a
land use control should never constitute a taking if it is related to a valid public purpose.
74. This is implicit in numerous cases in which the Arkansas Supreme Court has cited
the constitutional provision quoted in note 72 supra. See in particular the cases cited in
note 2 supra, although these are only a few of many of that type.
75. See note 73 supra.
76. See generally ALI, MODEL LAND DvLOPMENT Cona, Commentary on Art. 2
(1976).
77. F. Bossm MAN, D. CALLizs & J. BANTA, supra note 73, at 238.
78. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22. But obsolete as it is, it was repeated in the proposed
Constitution of 1980, which the voters rejected at the polls.
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amounts to a taking stems from the decision written by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 7 in 1922. How far the
regulation of property could be carried until it constituted a taking
had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. (This opinion was
preceded by his similar opinion in Rideout v. Knox"0 when he was
on the Massachusetts Supreme Court.) This approach reversed the
predominant thinking of the nineteenth century which, while ex-
pressing the sanctity of property rights as, for example, in the Ar-
kansas Constitution of 1874, was quite liberal as to the exercise of
the police power. In Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New
York s' the church was denied the continued use of a cemetery by
the city even though the city had many years before leased the
property to the church for use as a church and cemetery and had
covenanted for the continuance of such use. Today that would al-
most certainly be viewed as a breach of covenant which would give
rise to damages. Similar decisions involving somewhat different
factual situations were rendered by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in 1846 and 1853.82 But the most important of these nine-
teenth century cases was probably the United States Supreme
Court decision in Mugler v. Kansas.8 A Kansas prohibition statute
had effectively rendered a brewery largely worthless. Relying on a
nuisance analogy, the first Justice Harlan reasoned that police
power regulations which greatly depreciate property values do not
necessarily amount to a taking. While an analogy can be drawn to
some later Supreme Court cases, 4 these decisions did not view the
result as rendering the property practically worthless, nor did they
ignore the taking issue." The fact is that Pennsylvania Coal, de-
cided in the early twentieth century, was a limitation on a broader
view of the scope of the police power stemming from nineteenth
79. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
80. 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889).
81. 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826).
82. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55 (Mass. 1846); Commonwealth v. Alger, 7
Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851).
83. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
84. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915). These cases upheld non-comprehensive exercises of the police power based
upon a nuisance analogy.
85. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the Supreme Court was involved
with the prohibition of a brick manufacturing plant within a certain area. It was argued that
the manufacture of brick must be carried on where the clay is suitable for that purpose. The
Court disposed of the taking issue by stating that there was no prohibition on the removal




The legacy of Pennsylvania Coal is the case-by-case approach
to police power regulations which necessitates the identification of
criteria which will likely produce or will be taken into account in
reaching a particular result. Diminution in value, even though
fairly substantial, normally will not be enough in and of itself. The
promotion of the general welfare or the importance of the public
interest being protected is a consideration, although it alone is nor-
mally not conclusive. Public interest considerations are particu-
larly important in cases involving environmental protection. At the
other extreme, a resultant substantial diminution in value which
nonetheless serves to protect other landowners is illustrated
through the spot zoning cases. How great the harm to be prevented
is viewed in relation to societal values within a particular jurisdic-
tion is of obvious importance. The fact that, in place of preventing
a public harm, a public benefit was being secured under the guise
of the police power would apparently have led to a different result
in Just v. Marinette County,s" in which Wisconsin upheld a county
shoreland zoning ordinance and a state statute relating to shore-
land zoning. The Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished between
a public harm to be prevented, which it deemed to be a valid po-
lice power consideration, and a public benefit to be derived, which
it felt would amount to a taking.87
Considering all of this, an equation might be somewhat impre-
86. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
87. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
Many years ago, Professor Freund stated in his work on The Police Power, sec.
511, at 546-547, "It may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain
because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it is harm-
ful .... From this results the difference between the power of eminent domain
and the police power, that the former recognises a right to compensation, while
the latter on principle does not." Thus the necessity for monetary compensation
for loss suffered to an owner by police power restriction arises when restrictions
are placed on property in order to create a public benefit rather than to prevent a
public harm. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Vol. 1, ch. 6, pp. 6-7.
This case causes us to reexamine the concepts of public benefit in contrast to
public harm and the scope of an owner's right to use of his property. In the in-
stant case we have a restriction on the use of a citizen's property, not to secure a
benefit for the public, but to prevent a harm from the change in the natural char-
acter of the citizen's property. We start with the premise that lakes and rivers in
their natural state are unpolluted and the pollution which now exists is man
made. The state of Wisconsin under the trust doctrine has a duty to eradicate the
present pollution and to prevent further pollution in its navigable waters.




Public interest (weighed on the jurisdictional scale of values) +
public harm (to be prevented, if any) + interest of other land-
owners (not the public generally) - severity of loss to com-
plaining landowner and - public benefits unrelated to preventing
harm or to neutral public interests = either a valid exercise of
the police power or a taking."
Translating the foregoing into the Arkansas situation is not an
easy task. The Arkansas Supreme Court has dealt with the taking
issue largely in relation to eminent domain. There has been a
wealth of eminent domain litigation in Arkansas 9 but only a com-
parative thimbleful with respect to the police power. Early cases,
some of which went to the United States Supreme Court,90 upheld
basic exercises of the police power. These cases, however, were
geared to nuisance-like situations in which there was a basic public
interest consideration such as health or safety. These were prezon-
ing cases also, and the issue of zoning has seemed occasionally, al-
though inappropriately, to wave a different flag in the faces of Ar-
kansas judges.
The first Arkansas zoning case was Herring v. Stannus"1 in
1925, which arose after the enactment of the initial enabling legis-
lation. Little Rock had adopted a zoning ordinance which was far
from comprehensive but which prohibited construction of certain
multi-family and commercial structures without first obtaining a
permit from the city. The ordinance was challenged by persons
seeking to construct a gasoline station. The zoning was upheld, the
Arkansas Supreme Court stating that it must be presumed that
the city council would act in an intelligent, impartial, and honest
manner. In essence, Herring held that unless the municipality ac-
ted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable manner, or ex-
ceeded its authority under the enabling act, its zoning would be
upheld. This represents the generally accepted view in the United
States."s Herring has since been followed, 8 and it may be viewed
88. R. W1inUT & S. Wzumsm, LND USE IN A NuTsH 259 (1978).
89. By the mid-1960's, it was sufficient to justify a hardcover volume: R. WRIGHT, AR-
KANSAS EmNr DOMAIN DiGsr (1964). There have been numerous cases since then.
90. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of
Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919); and see also a leading Arkansas Supreme Court decision, City of
Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724 (1922).
91. 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1925).
92. Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W. 2d 179 (1974); Lowe v.
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as a viable rule of zoning law in Arkansas and one which is repre-
sentative of the basic American approach. Moreover, on a number
of occasions the Arkansas Supreme Court, in accord with the ex-
pressions in Herring, has reiterated its intent not to substitute its
judgment for that of municipalities in zoning matters." This is
viewed as being "consonant with a proper theory of judicial re-
view" by a prominent scholar in this field.95 Thus, while Herring
has been brutalized on a number of singularly undistinguished oc-
casions" which will subsequently be discussed in greater detail,
Herring is not dead. The basic rule remains and has been
applied.9'
Applied to the question of when there has been a taking as a
result of a zoning action, the Herring rule is that a taking occurs
only when the situation is so extreme that the municipality can be
said to have acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable
manner.8 However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has not been
consistent in its application of that doctrine. The problem stems
from what seems to be strictly an Arkansas peculiarity not known
to the jurisprudence of other states. It stems from the early 1940's
cases of McKinney v. City of Little Rock" and City of Little Rock
v. Bentley. °0  In McKinney the Arkansas Supreme Court stated
that it should not set aside the chancellor's decree and the action
of the city unless "we can say . . that the action of the Council
City of Missoula, 165 Mont. 38, 525 P.2d 551 (1974); City of Phoenix v. Beall, 22 Ariz. App.
141, 524 P.2d 1314 (1974); and see generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §
3.14 (2d ed. 1976).
93. City of Little Rock v. Fausett & Co., 222 Ark. 193, 258 S.W.2d 48 (1953); City of
Fordyce v. Dunn, 215 Ark. 276, 220 S.W.2d 430 (1949); McKinney v. City of Little Rock, 201
Ark. 618, 146 S.W.2d 167 (1941).
94. Stuttgart Shoe Real Estate Corp. v. City of Stuttgart, 241 Ark. 252, 407 S.W.2d
104 (1966); City of North Little Rock v. Habrle, 239 Ark. 1007, 395 S.W.2d 751 (1965); City
of Little Rock v. McKenzie, 239 Ark. 9, 386 S.W.2d 697 (1965); Economy Wholesale Co. v.
Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583 (1960).
95. Gitelman, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 ARK. L. REV. 22, 34 (1969).
96. City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S.W. 883 (1925), hereinafter dis-
cussed, was the first and probably the worst. City of Little Rock v. Bentley, 204 Ark. 727,
165 S.W.2d 890 (1942), reiterating the Pfeifer rule and creating confusion as to the test to
be applied in connection with judicial 'review, runs a solid second.
97. City of North Little Rock v. Linn, 252 Ark. 364, 479 S.W.2d 236 (1972); Wende-
roth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971); City of West Helena v.
Davidson, 250 Ark. 257, 464 S.W.2d 581 (1971); City of Little Rock v. Faith Evangelical
Lutheran Church, 241 Ark. 187, 406 S.W.2d 875 (1966).
98. See note 97 supra.
99. 201 Ark. 618, 146 S.W.2d 167 (1941).
100. 204 Ark. 727, 165 S.W.2d 890 (1942).
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and the decision of the court are unreasonable and arbitrary. '101
[Emphasis added.] It was held that the chancellor's 'decision was
not against the preponderance of the evidence - thus considering
not only whether the council's action was arbitrary but also the
chancellor's assessment of the weight of the evidence. In Bentley it
was reiterated that the chancellor would not be reversed where his
holding was not against the preponderance of the evidence. 10 2 No-
tice the somewhat subtle distinction between Herring and McKin-
ney and between McKinney and Bentley. The Herring test was
arbitrariness or the lack of it by the city. The McKinney test was
the arbitrariness or lack of it by the city and the chancellor and
whether the preponderance of the evidence supported the decision
made. The Bentley test was whether the chancellor's decision was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. As long as the
chancellor sustains the action of the city, there is not much of a
problem. But if a chancellor finds that the action taken by the city
is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, his decision must be
found to be against the preponderance of the evidence or it will be
sustained. Thus, having overcome the very heavy burden of finding
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the municipality, a
litigant attacking a zoning decision is now faced with the relatively
meager burden of "preponderance of the evidence." This is not a
particularly difficult mountain to climb, since in any situation in
which rezoning has been denied, the landowner will somewhere
find realtors or expert witnesses to testify that the current zoning
classification is inappropriate. The end result is to undercut the
true test-the question of whether the city acted in an arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable manner. The real question is not
whether the property might be used more profitably for something
else; it is not whether it might properly be rezoned for some use
not requested by the landowner; it is not whether the current zon-
ing is absolutely proper; it is not even whether there is some doubt
about the wisdom of the city's action, since reasonable minds may
differ and, in that situation, the city must be sustained in its ac-
tion.03 The sole question is whether the city acted arbitrarily, ca-
101. 201 Ark. at 731, 146 S.W.2d at 169.
102. 204 Ark. at 729, 165 S.W.2d at 892.
103. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated: "Fairly
debatable questions as to the reasonableness, wisdom and propriety of an ordinance are not
for the determination of the courts but for that of the legislative body on which rests the
duty and responsibility of the decision." City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., Minn. & 0. Ry.
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priciously, and unreasonably. 1 The weight given the chancellor's
findings erode that test and deter the court from considering the
true test of arbitrariness or the lack of it.
It should be noted in that context that the "arbitrary, capri-
cious, and unreasonable" test is predicated on the concept that in
adopting zoning ordinances and assigning zoning classifications, or
in its rezoning activities, municipalities are acting in a legislative
capacity. 105 The same test is generally applied to variances or con-
ditional use permits even though these are basically administrative
or quasi-judicial actions.'" Courts which have in recent years
turned away from the strong legislative presumption which favors
the validity of municipal actions of this type have done so not be-
cause municipal governments have exercised their authority arbi-
trarily on behalf of zoning as against real estate interests, but be-
cause they have lacked such diligence in enforcing basic principles
of planning and zoning that these courts have deemed it to be no
longer appropriate to accord their activities the strong presump-
tion accorded to a legislative act.101 Hand in hand with that is the
increased recognition that with the exception of the passage of the
zoning ordinance and the original large-scale classification of prop-
Co., 413 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
104. Id. As stated in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), the ordi-
nance will be sustained unless its "provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." See also
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608-09 (1927); McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 255 F.2d 154,
158-59 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1968); Herring v. Stannus, 169
Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1925).
105. See note 92 supra.
106, Probably the most down-to-earth discussion of this is contained in the concurring
opinion in Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974), in
which Justice Levine, after pointing out that action based on individual grounds is normally
legislative, states:
The time has come . . . to cast aside old slogans and catchwords. For most com-
munities, zoning as long range planning based on generalized legislative facts
without regard to the individual facts has proved to be a theoretician's dream,
soon dissolved in a series of zoning map amendments, exceptions and variances
reflecting, generally, decisions made on individual grounds brought about by un-
anticipated and often unforeseeable events: social and political changes, ecological
necessity, location and availability of roads and utilities, economic facts . gov-
ernmental needs, and, as important as any, market and consumer choice.
Id. at 168, 215 N.W.2d at 191-92. He concludes that local zoning authorities are acting on
individual grounds and are exercising administrative discretion.
107. This was the conclusion of the Oregon Supreme Court in Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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erty, most subsequent municipal actions involving rezoning or the
granting of variances or conditional use permits involve adminis-
trative, quasi-judicial, nonlegislative determinations.108
Arkansas follows the majority view that the legislative test is
to be applied to municipal zoning actions. Through its "preponder-
ance of the evidence" test applied to the chancellor's decision,
however, it has eroded the majority rule in situations in which the
chancellor rules against the municipality. The tendency of the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court over the past half-century has not been in
accord with the thinking which has motivated some courts to elim-
inate the legislative presumption favoring the action of the munici-
pality. The courts taking that step have done so to maintain the
integrity of zoning as against the influences of commercial real es-
tate interests. But, in the past few years, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has in some notable instances demonstrated a new aware-
ness of the need to maintain the integrity of the planning and zon-
ing process.1°° This is indeed a hopeful sign and may place Arkan-
sas more in the mainstream of the law on this subject.
Spot Zoning
A cardinal rule of the law of zoning is that "spot zoning" is
invalid per se because it singles out a small parcel of land for use
in a manner inconsistent with the other predominant land uses in
the area.110 As stated by the Maryland court:
'Spot zoning', the arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a small
area... to a use which is inconsistent with the use to which the
rest of the district is restricted, has appeared in many cities in
America as the result of pressure put upon councilmen. ... It is,
therefore, universally held ... [to be] invalid if it is not in accor-
dance with the comprehensive zoning plan and [if it] is merely for
private gain.
111
Oddly enough, the Arkansas cases have been somewhat ambiv-
alent in dealing with spot zoning even though the foregoing state-
108. See notes 106 and 107 supra.
109. See cases cited note 1 supra.
110. See generally 1 R. ANDBRSON, AEmICAN LAW OF ZONING § 5.08 (2d ed. 1976); 1 N.
Wn±iAms, AMERcAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 27.01 to -.08 (1974); and Annot., 51 A.L.R. 2d
263 (1957). See also Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113 (1954);
Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash. 2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963).




ment represents an uncontested view in the United States.112 The
Arkansas Supreme Court has spoken of spot zoning as a "danger":
We perceive that the chancellor was impressed, as are we, with an
abundance of evidence pertaining to the danger of spot zoning.
That danger was emphasized where, as here, there is no existing
barrier to prevent the spreading of rezoning into the exclusively
residential area to the north. 
11
This might be interpreted as viewing spot zoning as being a pro-
cess which is "dangerous" because it could lead to commercial in-
cursion into a larger residential area. That, of course, is the usual
result of spot zoning and is one reason why it is not countenanced,
but the opinion fails to come to grips with the basic question.
From a strictly legal standpoint, once spot zoning has been identi-
fied as such, the inquiry ends. Since spot zoning is contrary to the
comprehensive plan and the land uses in the area in which it is
proposed, it is invalid. But if you were to take the above quotation
literally, the allegation of spot zoning might be avoided by showing
that the proposed rezoning is "less dangerous" to neighboring
landowners than other varieties of spot zoning. Support for this
peculiar approach may be found in Tate v. City of Malvern:
Another rule of law comes into play because the Tate tract is sur-
rounded by property zoned residential. That means that he is
asking for spot zoning. Therefore an additional burden of proof is.
placed on the applicant. The decided weight of authority is
found in Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, § 8-4, third edition
(1965). It is there stated that the council can so amend a zoning
ordinance when the character of a zoned area has become so
changed that a modification is necessary to promote public
health, morals, safety and welfare; but mere economic gain to the
owner of a comparatively small area is not sufficient cause to
amend." [Emphasis added.]
The latter part of the statement is correct with regard to a sub-
stantial change of conditions in a particular area (although what is
needed then is a rezoning of the entire area as opposed to one lim-
ited tract). Moreover, by showing a sufficient change of conditions
in land use within an area, the allegation of spot zoning may be
avoided. But once actual spot zoning has been spotted, so to speak,
112. See note 110 supra.
113. Marling v. City of Little Rock, 245 Ark. 876, 881, 435 S.W.2d 94, 97 (1968).
114. 246 Ark. 316, 320-21, 438 S.W.2d 52, 54 (1969).
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any rezoning would be invalid, and as Tate states "mere economic
gain to the owner" is not a sufficient reason to rezone.
Non-Conforming Uses
Statutory authority permits "elimination of uses not in con-
formance with provisions of the ordinance."115 This authority,
however, has not proved to be particularly persuasive in attempts
by Arkansas cities to exercise affirmative means of disposing of
nonconforming uses through the device of amortization. ' " This de-
vice has been particularly successful in other jurisdictions in deal-
ing with such nuisance-like structures as junkyards and bill-
boards. 1 7 It has on occasion been used for more permanent
structures such as gasoline stations,118 although its utilization in
that regard necessitates a longer term with respect to the amortiza-
tion process.
One of the principal problems in zoning is how to deal effec-
tively with the nonconforming use, which is defined as "a lawful
use that existed when the zoning ordinance was adopted and that
is permitted by the ordinance to continue."11 The problem is one
of major proportions in such expanding areas as the western and
southwestern perimeters of Little Rock due to the absence of ex-
traterritorial zoning.15 0 As new land is annexed to the city, noncon-
115. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(b) (1980).
116. City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 547 S.W.2d 94 (1977). Contra,
Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973); E. B. Elliott
Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970); Grant v.
Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957); Naegele Outdoor Adver-
tising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
117. Grant v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957) (bill-
boards); Contra, City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1955). See
generally R. WRIGHT & S. WErER, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 148-49 (1978).
118. E.g. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950). See
also City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954) (permanent
structures).
119. City of Harrison v. Wilson, 248 Ark. 736, 737, 453 S.W.2d 730, 731 (1970).
120. The City of Little Rock has extraterritorial zoning authority within two miles
from the "thread" of the Arkansas River and for five miles along the River outside of the
city limits. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(e) (1980). The same, of course, would be true of such
cities as Pine Bluff and Fort Smith. However, under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2804.1 (1980), the
previously existing five-mile extraterritorial power of cities was revoked. The end result is
that nonconforming uses spring up and developers can do as they wish in unincorporated
areas in the absence of the exercise of zoning authority by counties. Little Rock and Pulaski
County are currently attempting an arrangement which permits the Little Rock Planning
Commission to assist the County in the planning and zoning of areas which are in the path
of urban growth.
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forming uses existing as a matter of right in the newly annexed
area create planning and zoning difficulties, breed litigation, and
often produce unsightly commercial strip zoning with concommi-
tant traffic hazards and congestion. In the Little Rock area, the
latter situation is generally summarized by the words, "Rodney
Parham," which refer to that portion of Rodney Parham Road
which lies generally between Reservoir Road and the beginning of
the Pleasant Valley residential area. The same may be said, how-
ever, of Asher Avenue and much of Geyer Springs Road in the
southwestern part of the city. Yet the status of a nonconforming
use approaches that of a vested right in the sense that attempts to
deprive the owner of the use existing at the time of the passage of
a more restrictive ordinance have been held to amount to a
taking.
121
An occasional threshhold question is whether a nonconforming
use existed at the time of the enactment of the zoning ordinance.
In Blundell v. City of West Helena,22 in 1975, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court seemed to adopt a "substantial use" test:
A mere contemplated use without active steps beyond prelimi-
nary work or planning or substantial investment to effectuate it is
not sufficient to invest a property owner with property rights in a
nonconforming use .... Preliminary contracts or work which is
not of a substantial nature is not sufficient to establish a vested
right .... The mere purchase of property with intention to
devote it to a use is not sufficient in spite of preliminary work,
such as clearing, grading and excavating, if that work is not of a
substantial nature, or if the owner has not incurred substantial
obligations relating directly to the use of the property.1
2
This is a reasonable approach to the issue and is one which corre-
sponds to the view taken by courts in other states.
12 4
Another problem relates to additions to or the expansion of an
existing nonconforming use. Generally speaking, a nonconforming
use cannot be expanded or enlarged.12 Moreover, it cannot be con-
121. Blundell v. City of West Helena, 258 Ark. 123, 522 S.W.2d 661 (1975).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 133-34, 522 S.W.2d at 668.
124. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 6.20, .22, .25 (2d ed.
1976). However, in Griffin v. County of Marin, 157 Cal. App. 2d 507, 321 P.2d 148 (1958), it
was held that the grading of the site prior to zoning established the nonconforming use.
125. City of West Helena v. Bockman, 221 Ark. 677, 256 S.W.2d 40 (1953); State v.
Perry, 149 Conn. 232, 178 A.2d 279 (1962); Town of Seekonk v. Anthony, 339 Mass. 49, 157
N.E.2d 651 (1959); County of Freeborn v. Claussen, 295 Minn. 96, 203 N.W.2d 323 (1972); 1
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verted to some other nonconforming use or some hybrid form.1 6 In
Arkansas, however, this latter question may depend on the localordinance and whether structural alterations are involved. One Ar-
kansas case upheld a change in use from a drug store to a
bakery.12 7 Upon examination of the ordinance, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court concluded that a change from one nonconforming use
to another was permissible in the absence of structural altera-
tions."2 Weight was given to the fact that before the building was
used as a drug store it had been a bakery and had been used com-
mercially for many years. This case is of questionable propriety. A
nonconforming use is by nature the antithesis of the comprehen-
sive plan for the area in question. It is tolerated only to avoid alle-
gations of an unconstitutional taking of property. The ultimate
hope is that it will be abandoned or otherwise be terminated. It is
not necessarily the structure but the use which is nonconforming.
To permit a nonconforming use to become any one of many non-
conforming uses would almost insure its perpetual survival.
12 9
Other than amortization, two ways in which nonconforming
uses are terminated are abandonment and destruction. In connec-
tion with abandonment, Arkansas has held that after nine years of
conformance, a prior nonconforming use had been abandoned.
Abandonment generally means more than a mere discontinuance.
The cessation of use must be coupled with an intent to abandon.' 13
Obviously, after nine years of cessation, an intent should be in-
ferred somewhat on the same theory as laches or estoppel. It would
be desirable to provide by statute that after a certain lapse of time,
such as one or two years, the discontinuance of a nonconforming
use will be deemed to constitute an abandonment and intent to
abandon will be inferred in the absence of some outside cause
preventing continuance of use. " 2
R. ANDERSON, supra note 124, § 6.43.
126. State v. Perry, 149 Conn. 232, 178 A.2d 279 (1962); Phillips v. Zoning Comm'r,
225 Md. 102, 169 A.2d 410 (1961).
127. City of Little Rock v. Williams, 206 Ark. 861, 177 S.W.2d 924 (1944).
128. Id. at 863, 177 S.W.2d at 925.
129. See generally Babcock, The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance, 52 Nw. U.L. REv.
174, 191 (1957); and Comment, Regulation of Urban Non-Conforming Uses in Arkansas:
Limitation and Termination, 16 ARK. L. REV. 270 (1962).
130. Branch v. Powers, 210 Ark. 836, 197 S.W.2d 928 (1946).
131. Board of Zoning Adjustment v. Boykin, 265 Ala. 504, 92 So. 2d 906 (1957); 1 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 124, at § 6.61; Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 279 (1974).
132. See the discussion of a Wisconsin provision along these lines in State ex rel. Brill
v. Mortenson, 7 Wis. 2d 325, 96 N.W.2d 603 (1959). There, however, it was not stated that
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Destruction of a nonconforming use by natural causes may
also terminate such use. In Moffatt v. Forrest City 38 a local ordi-
nance provided that if damage to a nonconforming use equalled
sixty percent or more of the reproductive value exclusive of foun-
dations, a nonconforming use could not be rebuilt. Louis Moffatt
had a building which consisted of a nonconforming meat market
on one side and his residence on the other. The Arkansas Supreme
Court upheld the city in not permitting the meat market to be re-
built after a fire destroyed more than sixty percent of the struc-
ture. However, if the city had not had such an ordinance, the meat
market could have been rebuilt. '" This differs from the rule relat-
ing to enlargement or expansion, which is prohibited even in the
absence of statute,13' or the rule relating to abandonment, which is
largely a question of fact in the absence of a relevant statute or
ordinance.
Although Arkansas has been relatively hostile to the amortiza-
tion device, it is the only really affirmative tool available for dis-
posing of nonconforming uses. The procedure involves determina-
tion of the normal useful remaining economic life of the structure
followed by a prohibition of that use of the structure beyond that
time. The language of the Arkansas statutes clearly seems to con-
template use of this device.1 " But the comparatively recent case of
City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc.13 7 casts considerable doubt upon
the survivability of this device when applied in Arkansas. In S & H
the court upheld that part of the Fayetteville ordinance which pro-
hibited existing flashing or blinking signs because this would ad-
versely affect safety,'" but it invalidated provisions amortizing ex-
cessively large signs over a seven-year period. This latter provision
was viewed as a taking and as related to aesthetics alone and not
to the police power.13' The extensive dissent in S & H is more in
keeping with the law on this subject in the United States and rep-
an intent to abandon would be inferred.
133. 234 Ark. 12, 350 S.W.2d 327 (1961).
134. See generally 1 R. ANDRSON, supra note 124, § 6.58 (2d ed. 1976).
135. Id. § 6.60.
136. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2808, -2829(b), -2831 (1980). Section 19-2829(b) specifi-
cally provides for elimination of nonconforming uses.
137. City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 547 S.W.2d 94 (1977).
138. Id. at 155, 547 S.W.2d at 98.
139. Id. But cf. Osage Oil & Transportation, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 260 Ark. 448,
541 S.W.2d 922 (1976).
1980]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
resents a more progressive viewpoint."1 0 At the present time, how-
ever, S & H can only be evaded by the argument that the amorti-
zation period was too short (which it actually was not for a sign
ordinance although the majority viewed it that way) and that it
was too bound up with aesthetics as opposed to the use of the po-
lice power.
Variances and Administrative Remedies
The United States Supreme Court decision in Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co. would surely have been different except for the fact
that the ordinance provided for some amelioration of the seeming
harshness of the zoning being imposed."' This has been true of
other ordinances since then. 42 There must be an escape hatch for
those singularly aggrieved by the literal imposition of the terms of
the ordinance. Otherwise, the potential of the ordinance for com-
mitting harm might be so extensive as to invalidate the whole of it
on due process grounds as opposed to the usual consideration of
whether relief should be afforded to a particular landowner.
There are two general types of variances employed in the
United States-the use variance and the area variance. The use
variance involves allowance of a different use within a zoned area,
such as a commercial or office use as opposed to some form of resi-
dential use. Use variances proved to be such a problem to the City
of Tulsa that it eliminated them altogether by ordinance-a posi-
tion which the Supreme Court of Oklahoma invalidated.14 That
decision is predicated on the peculiar viewpoint that use variances
are something of a matter of right if the landowner would suffer
hardship."' But in truth, the greatest enemy of zoning and orderly
140. City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 261 Ark. 148, 156, 547 S.W.2d 94, 98 (1977)
(Fogleman, J., dissenting); R. WRIGHT & S. WEBBER, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 149 (1978).
141. "The board is given power in specific cases of practical difficulty or unnecessary
hardship to interpret the ordinance in harmony with its general purpose and intent so that
the public health, safety and general welfare may be secure and substantial justice done."
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383 (1926).
142. See e.g., In re Devereaux Foundation Inc., 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, appeal dis-
missed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945).
143. Nucholls v. City of Tulsa, 560 P.2d 556 (Okla. 1976).
144. But cf. In re Devereaux Foundation Inc. 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, appeal dis-
missed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945). "Mere hardship is not sufficient; there must be unnecessary
hardship. . . . The power to authorize such a [use] variance is to be sparingly exercised and
only under peculiar and exceptional circumstances, for otherwise there would be little left of
the zoning law to protect public rights .. " Id. at 484, 41 A.2d at 747. See also R-N-R
Associates v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 100 R.I. 7, 210 A.2d 653 (1965).
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land use development is probably the use variance."1 5 Arkansas, to
the contrary of Oklahoma and to its credit, does not permit use
variances in zoning. Only area variances are permitted by the Ar-
kansas enabling act. '46
The Arkansas statute employs the language "undue hardship"
as the basis for granting area variances. The usual requirement is
that unnecessary hardship result to the landowner which is unique
and peculiar to his particular property.1 47 Some statutes permit
variances based upon unnecessary hardship or "practical difficul-
ties."" 1 8 The latter presumably would require less of a burden to
prove and would be particularly applicable in the area variance sit-
uation." As a practical matter, in terms of what courts and boards
of adjustment actually do, the difference in statutory phraseology
probably is minimal insofar as the end result is concerned. Cer-
tainly, this would seem to be the situation in Arkansas. An area
variance will almost invariably be granted when the landowner can
demonstrate that the peculiar shape of his lot, topographical con-
ditions, subsurface problems or the like render him unable to com-
ply with the requirements of the ordinance concerning such mat-
ters as the particular location of the structure on the lot. Area
variances usually do not involve the controversy relating to use
variances, and unless the request of the landowner involves a fa-
voritism which is unjustified by the particular situation or condi-
tion of his property, the variance is likely to be granted with no
objection from the neighbors and with no adverse effects to the
neighborhood. Of course, this is not to say that all area variances
should be granted. Variances which result from errors committed
by the landowner or the builder are generally inappropriate.15 The
desire of a landowner to build a larger house on a lot involving no
peculiar problems and being of ordinary size for the neighborhood
145. See Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARV. L. REv. 668, 673 (1969),
pointing out that petitions to depart from zoning requirements are usually approved almost
routinely throughout the United States unless there is opposition to the request.
146. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(b) (1980).
147. Id. The statute provides for the board of adjustment to hear requests for vari-
ances where enforcement of the ordinance "would cause undue hardship due to circum-
stances unique to the individual property. . . .The board of zoning adjustment shall not
permit, as a variance, any use in a zone that is not permitted under the ordinance." Com-
pare In re Village of Bronxville, 1 A.D.2d 236, 150 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1956) with In re Cresko,
400 Pa. 467, 162 A.2d 219 (1960).
148. In re Village of Bronxville, 1 A.D.2d 236, 150 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1956).
149. Id.
150. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 18.55, .56 (2d ed. 1976).
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with the result of evading setback requirements would not be justi-
fied (and probably would be prevented anyway by restrictive cove-
nants). Nonetheless, the area variance is less abrasive simply be-
cause it lacks the potential for deleterious impact possessed by the
use variance and because it should properly stem from problems
which are unique and peculiar to the property involved and which
may prevent the use or reasonable use of a particular lot. More-
over, conditions are usually or quite often imposed which are
designed to protect adjacent property, and the Arkansas statute on
the subject specifically provides for imposition of conditions.151
The Arkansas Supreme Court has at times apparently con-
fused variances with other devices utilized to provide relief where
appropriate. An example is Williams v. Kuehnert15 2 in which the
landowner sought to expand a nonconforming kindergarten. Al-
though the case was determined based upon provisions of an ordi-
nance providing for exceptions,158 the discussion in the opinion was
prefaced by quoting the statutory provision relating to variances.'"
What the court was actually doing is somewhat indistinct.15' The
court stated that a showing of undue hardship was not necessary
under the ordinance in question, but, of course, the local ordinance
could not supersede the statute. The case should properly be con-
strued as permitting an exception.1 "
A somewhat similar confusion is illustrated by City of Little
151. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(b) (1980): "The board of zoning adjustment may im-
pose conditions in the granting of a variance to insure compliance and to protect adjacent
property."
152. 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).
153. The Board had the power to permit certain uses in districts from which they were
excluded by the ordinance. Williams v. Kuehnert, 243 Ark. 746, 748-49, 421 S.W.2d 896, 897
(1967).
154. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(b) (1980).
155. After speaking of the statutory provision on variances, the Arkansas Supreme
Court stated that a showing of undue hardship was not necessary under the ordinance. Wil-
liams v. Kuehnert, 243 Ark. 746, 749, 421 S.W.2d 896, 898 (1967). If so, then there was no
need to speak of variances.
156. Neither a variance nor a plain exception should be confused with a special excep-
tion, special use permit, or conditional use permit. The latter three devices are essentially
the same and require that a judgmental decision be made as to whether the conditions are
appropriate, when tested by the requirements of the ordinance, to permit a special or condi-
tional use. If no criteria is provided in the ordinance or if the ordinance simply excepts
certain described uses, then such uses are exceptions. Churches, for example, might be ex-
cepted from use restrictions pertaining to single-family residential districts. On the other
hand, the board or commission might be called upon to pass judgment on whether a church
should be permitted as a conditional use, special use or special exception. See generally 3 R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 18.03 (2d ed. 1976).
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Rock v. Kaufman,1 5 7 although it is not possible to view that case
from any perspective other than the granting of a variance. The
landowner sought to expand an office building and its adjoining
parking lot. The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that lack of
adequate parking for the office tenants created an undue hardship
unique to this particular property and that other property in the
area would not be adversely affected if a variance were granted.'"
However, the ordinance involved was the same one as that in Wil-
liams v. Kuehnert,15 and the court seemed to rely somewhat on
the language involving exceptions. 60 The reason is unclear. More-
over, in terms of what constitutes "undue hardship," it would ap-
pear that the actual fact was simply that the landowner wanted to
improve the condition of his tenants. What he sought was desira-
ble, but probably not an undue hardship in its true legal mean-
ing."' It is also not particularly "unique" in Little Rock or in other
cities for a particular commercial structure to be short on parking.
Perhaps the strangest of the variance cases, however, is City of
Little Rock v. Leawood Property Owners Association.1 2 The
board of adjustment had denied application for a variance to per-
mit construction of a neighborhood swimming pool and recrea-
tional facilities in the contiguous subdivisions of the Leawood area
of Little Rock. The same ordinance was in effect as that involved
in Kuehnert and Kaufman, but the ordinance was not discussed in
the Leawood opinion. The Arkansas Supreme Court instead dis-
cussed a statute relating to subdivision controls, and concluded
that due to "the lack of any zoning classification for swimming
pools by the city zoning ordinances," the testimony, and the statu-
tory recognition of the desirability of community facilities, the va-
riance would be "in keeping with the spirit and intent of the provi-
sions of the zoning ordinance" and "the proposed variance would
157. 249 Ark. 530, 460 S.W.2d 88 (1970).
158. Id. at 532-33, 460 S.W.2d at 89-90 (1970).
159. 243 Ark. 746, 421 S.W.2d 896 (1967).
160. The ordinance is reproduced by the Arkansas Supreme Court in City of Little
Rock v. Kaufman, 249 Ark. 530, 531, 460 S.W.2d 88, 89 (1970).
161. See the language of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted in note 144 supra.
Presumably "undue hardship" in the Arkansas statutes is essentially the same as "unneces-
sary hardship." To be unnecessary or undue, it must be a severe hardship which would be
unreasonable to impose. Moreover, it must be a hardship which is unique and peculiar to
the property in question and not commonly found (although the problem might be unique
and peculiar to more than one lot).
162. 242 Ark. 451, 413 S.W.2d 877 (1967).
1980]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
not alter the character of the neighborhood."168 This peculiar com-
mentary demonstrates either a lack of understanding or a lack of
appreciation for the statutory requirements relating to variances.
The statute requires an undue hardship which is unique and pecu-
liar to the particular property involved. It would have been better
to have treated this as in keeping with the spirit and intent of the
zoning ordinance due to its enhancement of the residential charac-
ter of the area-and thus an implied exception.
Neither an exception nor a variance should be confused with
the device variously referred to as a conditional use permit, a spe-
cial use permit, or a special exception.16' Although some writers
attempt to distinguish between these devices, 11 5 they are essen-
tially the same thing.16 Basically, such permits may be issued
when the appropriate municipal agency finds that certain condi-
tions or requirements have been satisified. 167 That determination
involves the exercise of some discretion and necessitates a quasi-
administrative or quasi-judicial consideration. It provides flex-
ibility in the sense that certain uses which are not permitted as a
matter of right in particular use districts may be permitted condi-
tionally when the end result will not adversely affect the compre-
hensive plan for the area and is not incompatible with permitted
uses."6 Normally, a zoning ordinance would provide for such per-
mits to be administered by the board of adjustment, but the recent
Little Rock zoning ordinance provides for administration by the
Planning Commission. 6 ' This is due to the close connection be-
tween the planning and zoning process and the issuance of such
permits and the fact that conditional use permits possess a poten-
tial for determining the future of the area involved.
The conditional use permit device is quite valuable in provid-
ing flexibility to the decisions of boards or commissions involved in
the zoning process. It is not possible in an ordinance to pinpoint
163. Id. at 455, 413 S.W.2d at 880.
164. See Tullo v. Township of Millburn, 54 N.J. Super. 483, 149 A.2d 620 (1959); 3 R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 18.01, .05 (2d ed. 1976); Note, The Administration
of Zoning Flexibility Devices: An Explanation for Recent Judicial Frustration, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 973, 997 (1965).
165. Green, Are "Special Use" Procedures in Trouble?, 12 ZONING DiGST 73 (1960).
166. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 164.
167. See note 156 supra.
168. Churches and schools, for example, might be appropriate in some residential ar-
eas and not in others due to the nature of the area or the size of streets and traffic problems.
169. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 13,777 (Dec. 18, 1979), § 4-102(A).
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with accuracy the potential impact of every type of use. The same
general type of use, described in fairly broad terms, may be appro-
priate as a conditional use in one situation and not in another. The
impact upon the surrounding area may differ appreciably. The in-
flexibility of the old Little Rock ordinance often put the Planning
Commission and the City Board in the position of either acting in
a "hard-nosed" or "hold the line" manner in order to eliminate the
possibility of permitting questionable uses in certain zones or
loosely approving rezoning applications which held the potential
for producing an inappropriate change in the character of the area.
Obviously, the conditional use device reduces the potential for ar-
bitrary or unreasonable conduct by the city and enhances its abil-
ity to accommodate certain uses without creating potential harm.
In the conditional use permit situation, the uses will be per-
mitted if in the discretion of the Planning Commission and the
Board, certain conditions have been met-the most important one
being that the use in question will not be incompatible with the
surrounding neighborhood and will not adversely affect the plan
for the area. However, another practice which promotes flexibility
and which has been instituted in Little Rock, at least, provides the
basis for substantially greater controversy. It is a practice which
has not at this time been tested in the Arkansas courts, although it
has been either approved or disapproved by a fairly evenly divided
number of jurisdictions. This is the device, which will next be dis-
cussed, of attaching additional conditions to the approval of rezon-
ing applications.
Contract Rezoning and Conditional Rezoning
First, it should be reiterated that the rezoning process varies
from the process involving conditional use permits and variances.
The variance involves, or should involve, extraordinary relief per-
mitting a deviation from the requirements of the ordinance. A con-
ditional use permit, or special use permit, or special exception in-
volves a determination by the appropriate agency that conditions
set forth in the ordinance have been met and that the use should
therefore be permitted. Both procedures are clearly quasi-judicial
or quasi-administrative in the sense that judgmental or discretion-
ary actions are involved. In truth, rezoning is much the same in
that it usually involves a rather limited area or single parcel. Le-
gally, however, rezoning is viewed under the majority rule in the
United States as involving a legislative act (which is why it must
1980]
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:421
be approved by the City Board of Directors or City Council to be
effective). Of course, under the majority view, all of these activities
are clothed with the legislative presumption of validity even
though the granting of variances or approval of conditional uses is
purely quasi-judicial and quasi-administrative in nature.' "
Conditional rezoning does not refer in any way to the granting
of a conditional use permit. It involves a situation in which condi-
tions not provided for in the ordinance are attached to the ap-
proval of a rezoning application. The property is rezoned subject to
compliance with these added conditions.11
There would not seem to be anything improper about the city
attaching conditions to rezoning applications. Conditions are com-
monly attached to the approval of variances,7 and a building per-
mit will not be issued absent compliance. But rezoning is viewed as
a purely legislative act despite the ad hoc nature of the process
which normally takes place. If the process is viewed as strictly leg-
islative, then the city may not delegate its police power. It is for
this reason that contract rezoning is universally held invalid.
17
3
Contract rezoning is a negotiation process between the munici-
pality and a private person which leads to the reclassification of his
land. The bargaining aspect taints the transaction irretrievably be-
cause the municipal corporation is compromising its authority to
legislate under the police power for the welfare of the community.
170. E.g., in Montgomery County v. Mossburg, 228 Md. 555, 180 A.2d 851 (1962), the
Maryland Court of Appeals discusses whether conditions attached to the granting of a spe-
cial exception might be deemed unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. Zweifel Mfg. Corp.
v. City of Peoria, 11 Ill. 2d 489, 144 N.E.2d 593 (1957) involves a variance with conditions
attached. The variance would have to be shown to be arbitrary and capricious to overcome
the conditions. Of course, variances allow a prohibited use while conditional use permit. or
special exceptions involve situations which are permitted if the terms of the zoning ordi-
nance are met. Stacy v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 189, 210 A.2d 540 (1965). Neither
situation, however, actually involves legislative action. Each is a form of administrative or
quasi-judicial activity.
171. See generally Stefaniak, The Status of Conditional Rezoning in Illinois-An Ar-
gument to Sustain a Flexible Zoning Tool, 63 ILL. B. J. 132 (1974). Cases approving condi-
tional rezoning include Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 197 Kan. 731, 421 P.2d 213 (1966);
Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Bucholz
v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963); Church v. Town of Islip, 203
N.Y.S.2d 866, 168 N.E.2d 680 (1960); and State v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533
(1970). Conditional rezoning, as stated, varies from the granting of conditional use permits
or special exceptions because conditional rezoning attaches added conditions.
172. This is specifically authorized in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(b) (1980).
173. See Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corp., 267 Md. 364, 297 A.2d
675 (1972), which refuses to make a distinction between contract rezoning and conditional
mzoning. See also Stefaniak, supra note 170.
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This is viewed also as amounting to spot zoning and thus
invalid.""4
Conditional rezoning has been distinguished from contract re-
zoning in a number of jurisdictions.175 Those courts reason that if
the city is unilaterally imposing conditions which must be met and
if the rezoning is contingent upon compliance with such conditions,
then there is no contractual or bargaining process but simply the
unilateral exercise of authority by the municipality. 7 6 The imposi-
tion of the conditions is further justified on the pragmatic ground
that the landowner will be required to perform some action or con-
struct certain improvements that will insulate the area from any
adverse effects resulting from the rezoning. This approach protects
the plan for the area while accomodating the landowner-the im-
plicit idea apparently being that it might be held to be unreasona-
ble or arbitrary to deny a rezoning request which presents a bor-
derline situation and which would be reasonable and workable. if
certain conditions were met. An additional value to city planners is
that flexibility in the zoning process is enhanced by the ability to
rezone conditionally. A black or white answer can be avoided in
gray cases without any harm being done.
Unlike those courts which distinguish conditional rezoning
from contract rezoning, some jurisdictions take the position that
both are essentially the same. The Maryland Court of Appeals, for
example, has referred to "impermissible conditional zoning",v
7
which obviously means the same to Maryland as contract zoning.
These courts do not accept the distinction between a bilateral con-
tract (as in contract zoning) and a unilaterally imposed condition.
Admittedly, the distinction is somewhat tenuous since any devel-
oper or landowner goes through a fairly extensive period of discus-
sion and negotiation process of sorts with the planning staff and
possibly even the planning commission prior to approval of the re-
zoning. Thus "unilateral" conditions actually have usually been
worked out over a period of some time, and compromises have
been made by the developer on the one hand and the planning
staff or occasionally the commission on the other. Theoretically,
174. Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corp., 267 Md. 364, 297 A.2d 675
(1972).
175. See note 171 supra.
176. See note 171 supra.
177. Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty Corp., 267 Md. 364, 371, 297
A.2d 675, 680 (1972).
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this should not matter since the planning commission merely rec-
ommends approval of rezoning requests to the board of directors or
city council. As a practical matter, however, very few approvals of
rezoning requests are not approved by the city board or council.
At present, there seems to be a fairly even split of authority on
whether it is valid to make a distinction between conditional re-
zoning and contract rezoning, although the trend seems to favor
the distinction. It is agreed by all that contract rezoning is invalid.
The issue is whether to view conditional rezoning as constituting a
separate category. The validity of conditional rezoning has largely
been accepted in certain Midwestern and Northeastern jurisdic-
tions1 78 while some jurisdictions in the Southeast have refused to
make the distinction.1 79 There is no particular reason for this
seeming, although not unanimous, regionalism.
It is somewhat surprising, in view of the extensive use of the
conditional rezoning device in Little Rock in the past two years,
that Arkansas has never been presented with the question of its
validity. Planners, generally speaking, would favor upholding the
use of the device because of the flexibility and latitude which it
affords. Probably most developers would also favor it because it
presents the possibility of obtaining approval of a request which
might otherwise be denied. Perhaps that is the reason for the ab-
sence of litigation to this point. Litigation, when it does come, may
also obscure the issue by centering on whether the conditions being
imposed are unreasonable and arbitrary rather than whether con-
ditions may validly be imposed at all.
Zoning and Planning Devices: Buffer Zones, Floating Zones, Clus-
ter Zones and the Planned Unit Development
Buffer or transition zones, which are for the purpose of provid-
ing an orderly and non-abrasive transition from one use to another,
have long been utilized as a planning device. 80 There are no seri-
ous questions remaining as to the legitimacy of the device when
178. See note 171 supra.
179. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733,
187 S.E.2d 835 (1972); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 216 S.E.2d 199 (1975).
But see Haas v. City of Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d. 564 (1972) and Cross v. Hall
County, 238 Ga. 709, 235 S.E.2d 379 (1977).
180. Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman, 369 Ill. 207, 16 N.E.2d 131 (1938) is an early
case. See also Armstrong v. Mclnnis, 264 N.C. 616, 142 S.E.2d 670 (1965); 2 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.11 (2d ed. 1976).
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used in a reasonable manner and when not imposed to the point of
amounting to confiscation.181 An example of the latter would be a
situation in which a green belt, free of structures, was imposed
upon property without compensation to the landowner and with-
out any concommitant benefit to the owner of the green belt. (It
might be validly imposed, for example, as a condition to the devel-
opment of the remainder of the tract for a multi-family subdivi-
sion, thereby decreasing the impact of the higher density dwellings
on adjoining single-family zones.) The more common use of the
buffer or transition zone is to smooth the transition between a sin-
gle-family neighborhood and a commercial area by placing a multi-
family zone in between. A park or playground, of course, provides
a perfect vehicle for use of the buffer concept, and this permits an
even better transition between single-family and multi-family ar-
eas or between residential and commercial. Transition zoning was
simply an early recognition of the problem of accomodating dispa-
rate land uses.
More recent and more sophisticated efforts to achieve the ob-
jective of making neighboring land uses compatible have centered
around the cluster zone and the planned unit development (which
is generally called the PUD). These are similar devices but differ in
the sense that a cluster zone involves residential uses of varying
kinds while a PUD also permits compatible commercial uses and
may include light industry.18 2 Both devices are attempts to provide
flexibility and to enhance aesthetics and property values. Tradi-
tional Euclidian zoning was rigid in the sense that setback lines,
side-lot and back-lot lines, minimum lot sizes and the like pro-
duced subdivisions having much the appearance of a sheet of post-
age stamps. Structures were in similar locations on lots of similar
size.
Cluster zoning permits a relaxation of the setback, side-yard,
181. Buffer zones are usually or quite often interrelated with the rezoning of undevel-
oped land. Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court deemed it reasonable to require a 150
foot buffer strip between a residential area and an area being rezoned. Penny v. City of
Durham, 249 N.C. 596, 107 S.E.2d 72 (1959). The buffer zone becomes part of a package in
which the value of the rezoned property is enhanced to the point that its buffer part does
not have a confiscatory or even a serious effect. See also Armstrong v. McInnis, 264 N.C.
616, 142 S.E.2d 670 (1965).
182. One of the early cases approving the PUD was Chrinko v. South Brunswick
Township Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (1963). The distinction between
the PUD and the cluster zone was set out in Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Super-
visors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
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and other requirements so that residential uses may be clustered
closer together without increasing the population density. The
space that is freed through clustering becomes open space, wood-
land, parks and recreational facilities. Thus, the population density
remains the same and an area is created which has some of the
amenities of rural living within an urban environment. The device
has been used advantageously in certain rugged areas along the
California coast and the same could certainly be said for its poten-
tial in some of the rugged terrain in western Little Rock, the Fay-
etteville-Springdale area, the Hot Springs area, and similar moun-
tainous or hilly areas.
The Planned Unit Development or PUD is authorized by ordi-
nance in Little Rock,8 s although it has not been put to extensive
use by developers. The apparent reason is that it requires exten-
sive site plan review of the area being developed. As mentioned,
the potential scope of a PUD is greater than that of a cluster de-
velopment. Clustering still takes place in the sense that the popu-
lation density within the area is intended to remain about the
same as if setback and similar requirements were met. On the
other hand, there is a greater mix of uses within a PUD. The idea
is that these varying uses will be blended so as to create an aes-
thetically pleasing, interrelating unit which is advantageous in
terms of property values. The open land within the PUD should
provide a buffer between the commercial or light industrial area
and the residential area. Transition concepts are still important in
relation to the development of a PUD. In this respect, the PUD
concept of a harmonious blending of different uses is comparable
on a smaller scale to the new town concept.' 8" While the PUD ob-
viously lends itself to a potential for abuse if it is used as a sham to
permit commercial or industrial development in a non-orderly
manner within a residential area, it possesses a number of positive
values if used properly. For one thing, it has the planning value
183. Originally a separate ordinance, this was re-enacted as Article IX of Little Rock,
Ark., Ordinance 13,777 (Dec. 18, 1979).
184. Extensive material on new towns may be found in J. BEUSCHER, R. WRIGHT & M.
GITELMAN, LAND USE 1080-1101 (2d ed. 1976); and D. HAGMAN, URBAN AND LAND DEvELoP-
mENr 1048-1126 (1973). A new town is planned from its inception, and in England was
started in the open country and surrounded by green belts. In the United States, new towns
have more often than not been satellite communities established within commuting distance
of larger urban areas. A PUD takes on the potential of a new town if it involves a substan-




(and energy-saving value) of permitting people to live close to
shopping areas or close to where they work. If it is a carefully
planned PUD, it permits emphasis on the same aesthetic values
implicit in the cluster zone. In order to achieve its objective, an
appropriate PUD should contain a fairly substantial amount of
acreage, and the ordinance should require an adequate percentage
of open space. Otherwise, the PUD concept could be perverted for
monetary gain by land developers and could have an adverse im-
pact on neighboring residential property. Concern over this prob-
lem is the reason why careful site plan review is vital to the success
of the PUD.
When the Arkansas enabling act was passed in 1957, the PUD
concept was either non-existent or existed only in the theories of a
few urban planners or architects. It does have some interrelation-
ship with the older planning idea of having a number of satellite
cities or commercial areas within an urban complex rather than
placing so much emphasis on the central core.185 Obviously, it is
also a logical extension of the neighborhood shopping center com-
plex in that it simply goes a step beyond by attempting to plan the
residential component as well. Be that as it may, the Arkansas
statutes are silent with regard to the PUD, the cluster zone con-
cept, and similar modern devices aimed at providing flexibility in
lieu of older planning and zoning concepts. The intent of the ena-
bling act, however, would appear to permit such devices. Planning
is intended to be implemented through zoning, which involves va-
rious bulk and density controls, but there is nothing in the statute
which would prevent a juggling of such controls in such a way as to
achieve better planning.118 Moreover, the same provisions give the
planning commission extensive power over subdivision develop-
ments, 187 and the PUD and cluster zone represent forms of subdi-
vision development with certain ordinary zoning requirements
waived in order to achieve worthwhile objectives. Thus, while the
PUD has never been challenged in Arkansas, the device probably
185. This concept, along with the use of the PUD, is especially relevant today in view
of the energy shortage. Cities will increasingly have to consider the energy problem in con-
junction with planning.
186. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(d) (1980) states that the city legislative body may
establish setback lines on major streets. Subsection (c) states that the municipality may
establish certain regulations controlling subdivision of land. The overall thrust of the Ar-
kansas statutes should present no impediment to the PUD device. See in particular Id. § 19-
2825(a).




The floating zone is something of a forerunner of the PUD and
cluster zones which seem not to have been very widely used in the
United States and which met with divided opinions when chal-
lenged in the courts. Basically, the particulars of such a zone are
defined in the ordinance, but its location is not designated on maps
of the municipality. The idea is that when the planning commis-
sion or board finds that a situation exists which calls for that par-
ticular type of zone, then it ceases to "float" and comes to earth, so
to speak, at that location by virtue of the rezoning process.1 88 In
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown,'"" a 1951 case, New York upheld
the device when it was used to permit a floating zone of garden
apartments to be located in a single-family residential area. The
Court of Appeals felt that this action was part of the comprehen-
sive plan and did not amount to spot zoning. Maryland followed
suit, even to the point of permitting a restricted manufacturing
district to "float" into a largely residential area.1 90 Pennsylvania,
however, invalidated the floating zone device as amounting to spot
zoning and as not being in accord with the concept of comprehen-
sive planning."91
The question is probably moot in Arkansas. The floating zone
device is not in general use in the state, and the PUD provides
greater flexibility along with greater planning utility.
Lot Size, Setback, and Similar Requirements
The recently adopted Little Rock zoning ordinance has provi-
sions relating to minimum lot sizes." 2 Also, as contemplated by the
state enabling act, it has numerous provisions pertaining to set-
back requirements as to the front yard, backyard and side of the
lot.193 The ordinance also contains height restrictions."94 In sum-
188. On the floating zone device, see generally Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use
of the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. REV. 105 (1963); Comment, Zoning-The Floating Zone: A
Potential Instrument of Versatile Zoning, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 85 (1966).
189. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
190. Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957). See also Beall
v. Montgomery County Council, 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965).
191. Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). See, on this
case, Haar & Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning or an In-
flexible Judiciary, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1552 (1961).
192. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 13,777 (Dec. 18, 1979) §§ 7-101.1(d)(4), .2(d)(4),
.3(d)(4), .4(d)(4), .5(d)(4), .6(d)(4), .7(d)(5), .8(e)(4).
193. Id. §§ 7-101.1(d), .2(d), .3(d), .4(d), .5(d), .6(d), .7(d), .8(e), .9(e).
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mary, it follows the traditional Euclidian pattern of dictating in
large measure the location of a building on a particular lot. There
is nothing peculiar about any of this" 5 and the legality of such
regulations has not come into question in Arkansas. If any of these
provisions were to be challenged, it would likely be those relating
to minimum lot sizes. The minimum lot sizes in the Little Rock
ordinance, however, are so extremely minimal that it seems un-
likely that a challenge would meet with success. The largest of the
minimums is 15,000 square feet, and numerous cases in other
states have upheld much higher minimums.196 If Little Rock had
adopted an ordinance permitting a zone requiring three-acre mini-
mum lots and had imposed a requirement of that type on the more
expensive residential area developing beyond Pleasant Valley, the
developers probably would have set Olympic records heading for
the courthouse. Yet, although there are cases to the contrary,
three-acre lot minimums have been upheld as well as even larger
minimum lot sizes.
1 97
The arguments for and against minimum lot sizes are proba-
bly immaterial in Arkansas because of the de minimus nature of
the minimum sizes. The basic argument of developers against min-
imum lot sizes, however, is that they bear no reasonable relation-
ship to the police power and that they are therefore confiscatory in
194. Id. §§ 7-101.1(c), .2(c), .3(c), .4(c), .5(c), .6(c), .7(c), .8(d), .9(d).
195. See generally 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 9.50 -.67 (2d ed.
1976); Goldston & Scheur, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 Hxav. L. REV.
241 (1959); Toll, Zoning for Amenities, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PRoH. 266 (1955). The Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act, prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1928, and
which formed the basis or model for practically all state enabling acts in the early days of
zoning, provided for height, size, amount of the lot which could be occupied, size of lots and
open spaces, and population density.
196. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 13,777 (Dec. 18, 1979) § 7-101.1(a) (1979). Cases
approving large minimum lot sizes include Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153
A.2d 415 (1959) (four-acre minimum); County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. Miles,
246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967) (one zone with a five-acre minimum in a relatively rural
area); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1943) (one-acre mini-
mum); Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771, appeal
dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952) (three-acre minimum); Franmor Realty Corp. v. Wesbury,
280 App. Div. 945, 116 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1952) (two-acre minimum).
197. See note 195 supra. But cf. Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd., 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d
567 (1971) (reversing an increase from one to two acres); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346
Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964) (striking down a 100,000 square foot minimum); In re Kit-
Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (striking down two-acre and three-acre
minimums); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (striking
down an increase from one-acre to four-acre minimums); Board of County Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (striking down a two-acre minimum).
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nature and constitute a taking under the guise of the police
power.19 The arguments supporting minimum lot sizes are predi-
cated on the police power-e.g., that safety is promoted through a
reduction of the hazard of fire and through a reduction in traffic
congestion; that health is benefitted by the aesthetics and quietude
of large lots and by minimizing the requirements as to sewer and
water lines; and that the public welfare in general is benefitted
through the protection of property values and in relation to the tax
base.19 9 The difficulty with some of the arguments which support
large minimum lot sizes is that if a large minimum is for the public
welfare in one area, then the same should be true in other parts of
the municipality. This line of thought proved to be the downfall of
the ordinance in one situation involving minimum floor space re-
quirements for houses.2 0 Minimum floor space requirements have
generally been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power,20'
although the question is largely moot in Arkansas because of the
tendency to leave it to be handled through restrictive covenants in
subdivision developments.
In summary, the bulk, height, setback, and lot area require-
ments in Arkansas are both traditional and minimal. Litigation as
to the basic question of validity appears unlikely.
Exclusionary Zoning
One of the most discussed topics in land use litigation in re-
cent years relates to exclusionary zoning. In a sense the term "ex-
clusionary zoning" is a redundancy. All zoning is exclusionary in
one way or another. Euclidian zoning was cumulative in nature in
that higher uses (e.g., residential) were permitted in lower use
zones (e.g., commercial). More recent ordinances have tended to-
ward non-cumulative zoning. For example, housing (in the absence
of a planned unit development) would not be permitted in an in-
dustrial zone. This has the advantage of preventing disparate land
uses within essentially the same area as well as preventing litiga-
198. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
199. See Josephs v. Town Bd., 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1960) and In re
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
200. In re Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
201. Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1409, 1411 (1964). The leading case is probably Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919
(1953). See also Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943).
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tion arising from the law of nuisance."'
But the cases on exclusionary zoning do not relate to the es-
tablishment of zones in general or to cumulative or non-cumulative
zoning ordinances. Exclusionary zoning arises in situations in
which a municipality zones in such a manner as to prevent a sub-
stantial number of people or certain economic, racial, or age groups
from living there. While other discussions of exclusionary zoning
go into much greater detail,03 this discussion will attempt only to
pinpoint the more common situations in which such allegations
arise due to the fact that the question has not yet been presented
in Arkansas:
(1) The minimum lot size cases. These were some of the ear-
lier exclusionary zoning cases and were brought by developers. In
addition to the standard arguments of the lack of relationship of
large lot zoning to the police power and the confiscatory nature of
the restrictions, the added argument was advanced that the end
result would be to exclude people from the community. One of the
leading cases on this is National Land & Investment Co. v.
Kohn,20 4 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that a
township faced with an expanding population in the area could not
block suburban development through large minimum lot sizes.2 05
The seed of this idea was planted earlier by the Massachusetts Su-
202. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932) is an
example of the nuisance problem and how it can arise. See also, City of Fort Smith v. West-
ern Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724 (1922); Koseris v. J. R. Simplot Co., 82 Idaho
263, 352 P.2d 235 (1960); York v. Stallings, 217 Or. 13, 341 P.2d 529 (1959). In Rockenbach
v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 47 N.W.2d 636 (1951), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that
the weight of authority is to the effect that a zoning ordinance permitting certain uses in a
particular zone is not controlling as to whether the use in question might be enjoined as
constituting a nuisance. But see Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 181 Colo. 309, 509 P.2d 588
(1973), but note the dissent of Chief Justice Pringle.
203. See generally 27 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST, No. 6 (1975) dealing with
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Wright, Constitutional Rights and Land Use
Planning: The New and the Old Reality, 1977 DuKE L.J. 841 (1978); Davidoff & Davidoff,
Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971).
204. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
205. The township had increased the lot minimum from one acre to four acres and had
diminished the value of the tract from $260,000 to $175,000 in so doing. Easttown Township
was almost exclusively residential and was in the path of population expansion from two
directions in the area near Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that zon-
ing could not be used as a device to stand in the way of a growing population and prevent
the entrance of newcomers. This position was reaffirmed in In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439
Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
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preme Court in Simon v. Town of Needham,206 which upheld a
one-acre minimum but stated that this type of regulation could not
be employed to exclude people who wished to live there and build
on lots of reasonable size. (The developers in National Land, of
course, were not particularly concerned about excluding people but
about securing the greatest possible return on their investment.
This and other cases, however, lent impetus to litigation based
upon civil rights arguments as opposed to the more traditional ar-
gument of taking-versus-police power.)
(2) The minimum dwelling size cases. These cases are perhaps
more important for the controversy that they spawned and the is-
sues presented in the arguments than for what they actually held.
The most important of them was Lionshead Lake v. Township of
Wayne,2 7 a 1953 New Jersey case which was attacked by a leading
scholar as promoting economic segregation. 0 8 What the New
Jersey Supreme Court did was to uphold zoning requiring
minimum floor space requirements for single-family dwellings on
the basis that a minimum area was required for the mental health
of the occupants. Minimum floor space requirements have gener-
ally been upheld in the United States.20 9 Even though the situation
in Lionshead Lake related to a problem created by vacation or sec-
ond homes, it was argued that such requirements would exclude
people on the basis of economics. The theory of those attacking
Lionshead Lake survived to manifest itself in subsequent exclu-
sionary zoning cases.2 1
206. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). See also Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346
Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964).
207. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
208. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1051 (1953). A response to Professor Haar's article was made by two other law profes-
sors: Nolan & Horack, How Small A House?-Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67
HAiv. L. REv. 967 (1954). This was followed by Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for
Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. REv. 986 (1954). See also Williams & Wacks, Segrega-
tion of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L.
REv. 827; Babcock, Classification and Segregation Among Zoning Districts, 1954 U. ILL.
L.F. 186.
209. Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1409, 1411 (1964).
210. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. S08 (1975). Mount Laurel's system of land use
regulation was such that the court found that people of low and moderate income were
being effectively excluded from moving there. The New Jersey Supreme Court found this
type of zoning to be violative of the substantive due process and equal protection require-
ments of the New Jersey Constitution. The decision was not based on racial discrimination
but on economic discrimination resulting from the exclusion of housing intended for low and
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(3) The mobile home cases. One of the arguments advanced by
Justice Sutherland in sustaining comprehensive zoning in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.2" was that apartment houses
should not be permitted to co-exist with single-family dwellings.
He spoke of apartment houses as some people since World War II
have spoken of mobile homes.2 2 Some municipal corporations have
attempted to exclude mobile homes by not providing for them in
the zoning ordinance. This has been upheld in some cases and in-
validated in others.213 The argument that it is invalid not to pro-
vide for mobile homes in certain zones within the general area is
based on the view that this amounts to an exclusion of an other-
wise valid residential use.214  It obviously has economic
ramifications.
(4) The "timed and sequential growth" cases. These cases in-
volve subdivision developments rather than zoning, but they inter-
relate with the problem of exclusion. If a suburban community is
in the path of rapid urban expansion, it may find itself over-
whelmed in its ability to provide the necessary municipal services
to cope with such rapid growth. It is reasonably clear that a "no
growth" policy which would have the effect of excluding outsiders
by keeping population at a predetermined level would be an un-
constitutional violation of the interstate commerce clause and the
moderate income groups.
211. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
212. Sutherland wrote:
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the develop-
ment of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment
houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private
house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere
parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the
coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering by their height
and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun
which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and bringing, as their neces-
sary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and busi-
ness. . . until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desira-
bility as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these
circumstances, apartment houses . . . come very near to being nuisances.
Id. at 394-95.
213. Compare Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1962), with Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc., 111 R.I.
120, 300 A.2d 465 (1973). See also Gust v. Canton Township, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772
(1955).
214. See Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129, (Hall, J., dissenting),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1962).
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right to travel freely from place to place.2 15 On the other hand, if
the development of municipal facilities is keyed to a plan which
permits population expansion to coincide with construction of fa-
cilities, and if the plan results from careful study and is reasonable
and not arbitrary, then the plan will likely be approved. 16
(5) The multi-family dwelling cases. These cases are in the
forefront of litigation on exclusionary zoning. The city of St. Louis
and its satellite suburban communities in St. Louis County provide
a prime example of the problem. The situation is described graphi-
cally by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. City of Black Jack.21 7 In essence, the court demonstrated
that a zoning regulation in Black Jack which excluded multi-family
dwellings (and thereby excluded public housing for low income
families) had the effect of locking into the city of St. Louis low
income people, a substantial proportion of whom were blacks.
Black Jack's ordinance was invalidated because of its discrimina-
tory effect. Something of a limitation on this case, however, is Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. 1 8 a more recent United States Supreme Court decision
which stated (a) that only racial, and not economic, segregation
was prohibited under the Constitution and civil rights legislation;
(b) that the 14th amendment was violated (in the absence of a tak-
ing) only if there was a discriminatory intent; but (c) that in con-
nection with public housing cases, the test might be somewhat dif-
ferent. Upon remand, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that the fair housing legislation might impose standards which
were more stringent and could invalidate local zoning under condi-
tions which fell short of showing an intent or purpose to discrimi-
nate. A showing of some discriminatory purpose joined with a dis-
criminatory effect or simply the effective exclusion of publicly
supported housing projects due to zoning regulations could invali-
date the zoning.219 The Eighth Circuit has since followed with a
decision which is even stronger and which may go too far under the
215. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
216. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
217. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
218. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
219. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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Supreme Court decision in Arlington Heights. 220
Of course, Arlington Heights and Black Jack were cases in-
volving public housing and in which the question of racial discrimi-
nation and the civil rights of minorities was the central issue. Al-
though New Jersey has held that economic discrimination resulting
from zoning is unconstitutional under its state constitution, 2'
other states have upheld zoning regulations which limited all land
use in a suburban community to single-family residential. Missouri
is a prime example of one jurisdiction so holding, in other cases
involving the St. Louis area,222 although there is authority to the
contrary.223 Even in the public housing situation, no less a civil lib-
ertarian than Justice Hugo Black wrote in James v. Valtierra22,
that the state of California, because of its long history of the use of
the initiative and referendum process, could provide for a public
referendum in a community before a public housing project would
be allowed. 225 Nonetheless, the Arlington Heights test enunciated
by the Seventh Circuit upon remand by the Supreme Court indi-
cates that in the absence of such a situation as that in California,
exclusion of public housing is viewed differently from exclusion of
multi-family housing in general.
Cases of this type seem less likely to arise in Arkansas than in
220. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied sub nom. City of Black Jack v. Bates, 445 U.S. 905 (1980). This case goes be-
yond the Seventh Circuit's formula in Arlington Heights, in indicating that the city should
be "required to take affirmative steps . . . in its efforts to bring low cost housing to Black
Jack." 605 F.2d at 1040.
221. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
222. McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970).
223. Gundersen v. Village of Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. 352, 126 N.W.2d 715 (1964),
which relied in part upon an earlier Missouri case which was reversed in McDermott v.
Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970). See also Dowsey v. Village of Ken-
sington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
224. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
225. The Supreme Court of Ohio in Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake,
41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975), concluded that a provision for a mandatory
referendum on changes in land use was a denial of due process of law, but the United States
Supreme Court reversed this decision in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,
426 U.S. 668 (1976). The problem with referendums, mandatory or otherwise, is that there is
a general lack of knowledge and expertise on the part of the public and the bias or whim of
the majority prevails. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the end result of the Cali-
fornia requirement is to permit exclusion of public housing by a popular vote based upon
racial or economic prejudice. The decision still stands, but it seems in clear conflict with the
thinking of more recent United States Supreme Court cases on the subject of public hous-
ing, such as Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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states with large urban areas. A case relating to this situation
would more likely arise in a setting comparable to that in Hills v.
Gautreaux.226 That case required the Chicago Housing Authority
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to seek
area-wide solutions to the public housing problem in the Chicago
area. This meant that public housing projects had to be dispersed
throughout the area, including the suburbs, and not centered in
certain sections of the City of Chicago. (This ultimately led to the
Arlington Heights confrontation.) An analogy was drawn to a lead-
ing school busing ca 22 It could be argued, in the case of Little
Rock, that future public housing should not be located east or
south of the business district and should be dispersed throughout
the city or into North Little Rock, Sherwood, and Jacksonville.
Perhaps the Little Rock metropolitan area is not sufficiently large
to sustain such an argument, but the argument is not beyond the
realm of possibility.
Particular Types of Uses.
Arkansas has had litigation involving certain types of uses
which did not stem directly from zoning regulations but which af-
fect zoning law. An example is the line of cases holding funeral
homes to be a nuisance per se when located in a predominantly
residential area.228 The underlying reasoning of such cases is the
discomfort and malaise produced in the neighbors by the presence
of the funeral home. Thus, in a sense, the basis for the reasoning is
predicated upon aesthetic considerations.229 On the other hand,
cemeteries are generally not viewed as nuisances in the absence of
potential health hazards.23 0 Apparently, the feelings of the neigh-
226. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
227. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the opinion
in Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub. nom. Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). He distinguished the reason for denying an area-wide solu-
tion in that case from the logic of an area-wide solution to the public housing problem in the
Chicago area.
228. See, e.g., Powell v. Taylor, 222 Ark. 896, 263 S.W.2d 906 (1954).
229. This is apparent from such cases as Smith v. Fairchild, 193 Miss. 536, 10 So. 2d
172 (1942); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202 (1924); Fraser v. Fred Parker
Funeral Home, 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577 (1942). The Missouri case speaks of the psycho-
logical problems and mental depression produced by the proximity of a funeral home.
230. McDaniel v. Forrest Park Cemetery Co., 156 Ark. 571, 246 S.W. 874 (1923); Mc-
Caw v. Harrison, 259 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1953); Jones v. Highland Memorial Park, 242 S.W.2d
250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Young v. St. Martin's Church, 361 Pa. 505, 64 A.2d 814 (1949). If
a cemetery endangers the public health in some way, it can constitute a nuisance.
468 [Vol. 3:421
ZONING LAW
bors are somewhat mitigated if the nearby deceased are securely
planted rather than awaiting interment. In any event, zoning ordi-
nances must take account of nuisance doctrine in this regard.
Another situation which relates even more directly is that in-
volving "halfway houses" for the rehabilitation of prison inmates
or guidance centers for juvenile delinquents or mentally disturbed
individuals. Courts have often found it reasonable to exclude such
facilities from single-family districts. Although the decisions are
predicated on the police power, the basis for such exclusion is actu-
ally the hostility, fear, and general discomfort of neighboring land-
owners. Arkansas has held that the operation of a halfway house in
a residential neighborhood would constitute a nuisance.2 3 1 The end
result of that case is to exclude such operations from constituting a
permissible use within a residential zone even though the underly-
ing social purpose of such houses is to rehabilitate the residents to
living in free society. Presumably, the rule would apply regardless
of the particular residential classification.
Certain uses, on the other hand, have received preferred treat-
ment over the years. A prime example is the location of churches
in single-family residential districts. Some courts have taken the
view that churches are entitled as a matter of right to build in such
areas since to do otherwise would offend the first amendment to
the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. 32  Other courts have chosen to treat
churches as uses which must be permitted in residential areas un-
less reasonable provision has been made for them within the gen-
eral vicinity or elsewhere in the community, while in some situa-
tions, courts have approved the use of conditional use permits in
relation to churches - i.e., churches are treated by the ordinance
231. Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation v. Needler, 252 Ark. 194, 477 S.W.2d 821
(1972).
232. The Texas Supreme Court stated in City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115,
119, 183 S.W.2d 415, 417 (1944):
To exclude churches from residential districts does not promote the health, the
safety, the morals or the general welfare of the community, and to relegate them
to business and manufacturing districts could conceivably result in imposing a
burden upon the free right to worship and, in some instances, in prohibiting alto-
gether the exercise of that right. An ordinance fraught with that danger will not
be enforced.
See also Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur Council of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83,
117 N.E.2d 115 (1954); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827
(1956); State v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
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as conditional uses in residential districts. 233 The Little Rock zon-
ing ordinance follows this latter procedure.234 Although this ques-
tion has not been considered in Arkansas, it would seem that the
latter procedure should be upheld. Churches are not being ex-
cluded, and unless a proposed church offers particular problems,
such as through the additional construction of recreational facili-
ties which will present abnormal traffic problems, a conditional use
permit will usually be granted.
Other designated preferred uses include hospitals and schools.
The problem with designating a use as "preferred" is that many
residential areas cannot accomodate the problems produced by
such uses, and if a use is "preferred," the burden passes to the
municipality to justify its exclusion.8 5
In that regard, schools provide additional considerations which
spawn litigation. If a zoning ordinance permits public schools
within a given zone, for example, is it legitimate to exclude paro-
chial or private schools? Some courts have held that public schools
are a governmental function and thus can be distinguished on that
basis.2s This is a rather tenuous argument. The object of zoning is
to fulfill a sound plan for the area, and it is difficult to argue ra-
tionally that a public school is somehow less of an influence or
problem with regard to the plan than a private or parochial school.
The better view, therefore, is that no reasonable distinction can be
made.237 Further, it should be observed that private and parochial
schools also serve a public function indirectly through relief of the
burden on the public schools. In this same regard, it seems untena-
ble under ordinary circumstances to permit high schools and ele-
mentary schools in a zone and exclude kindergartens or day
schools.2 8 While there are certain requirements with regard to the
233. State v. Village of Bayside, 12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288 (1961).
234. Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 13,777 (Dec. 18, 1979) §§ 7-101.1(B)(4)(2), 7-
101.3(B), 7-101.4(B), 7-101.5(B)(3), 7-101.6(B)(3), 7-101.7(B)(2) (1979). Several cases uphold
denials of special or conditional use permits to churches under this type of ordinance. West
Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956);
Galfas v. Ailor, 81 Ga. App. 13, 57 S.E.2d 834 (1950); Milwaukee Council of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958).
235. See Williams, The Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 80,
92 (1970).
236. State v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43 (1954), appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 913
(1955).
237. See Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d
438 (1955); Catholic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583 (1939).
238. See City of Chicago v. Sachs, 1 Ill. 2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1953).
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land area required for high schools and elementary schools, which
may not exist for kindergartens, the ultimate adverse impact on
the neighborhood would seem to be much less as the result of the
operation of a kindergarten or day school.
Although there are preferred uses, there are also non-preferred
uses, so to speak. Clubs, fraternities, and sororities have uniformly
been barred from single-family residential districts.2 39 This is logi-
cal and appropriate. But peculiar judicial gyrations occur if the sit-
uation involves an order of nuns or housing for -nurses attached to
religious groups.2 40 While reason is defied as far as zoning is con-
cerned, courts apparently prefer nuns and nurses to Pi Phis and
Tri Delts.2 4'
IV. AN ARKANSAS ODDITY: THE "PFEIFER RULE"
AND ITS LINGERING DEMISE
The Pfeifer rule, as it came to be known, has received ade-
quate attention in the past.2 42 The attention was merited only be-
cause the rule was an Arkansas peculiarity unknown to the law of
other states and contrary to the basic propositions of zoning as ex-
pressed both in the Arkansas statutes and in the fundamental pre-
mise that zoning is the result of a comprehensive plan. The Pfeifer
rule did not have anything to do with a plan regardless of whether
the plan was meritorious or defective. City of Little Rock v. Pfei-
fer2 4. laid down this rule: "[A]ny attempt on the part of the city
council to restrict the growth of an established business district is
arbitrary.24 4 Of course, nothing could have been more arbitrary or
contrary to comprehensive planning than that statement itself.
The Pfeifer rule is largely or should be only of historical sig-
239. See, e.g., City of Schnectady v. Alumni Ass'n of Union Chapter, 5 App. Div. 2d
14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1957).
240. See, e.g., Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1954); La-
porte v. City of New Rochelle, 2 N.Y.2d 921, 141 N.E.2d 917, 161 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1957);
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d
627 (1954).
241. It is an incredulous strain on judicial logic to conclude that a religious order or
home for nursing students fits the single family classification. These should properly fall
into the same zoning category as that relating to fraternities or clubs, For a discussion of
what constitutes a family, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). On clubs,
see Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1098 (1957).
242. See Gitelman, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 AsK. L. REV. 22 (1969);
Gitelman, The Role of the Neighbors in Zoning Cases, 28 ARK. L. REV. 262 (1974).
243. 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S.W. 883 (1925).
244. Id. at 1029, 277 S.W. at 885.
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nificance today. The basic premises which sustain planning and
zoning and thus are the antithesis of Pfeifer led to its ultimate
downfall. The process began as early as 1952 in Evans v. City of
Little Rock. 245 Evans rather weakly invoked the Pfeifer doctrine in
that the landowner sought to expand a small nonconforming fac-
tory into what was almost an exclusively residential area. The first
important rejection of the rule did not occur until a year later in
City of Little Rock v. Connerly2"4 in which the landowner wanted
to rezone property on Broadway in Little Rock from an apartment
classification to commercial in order to operate a radio and appli-
ance shop. Although the area was one of mixed commercial, office,
and multi-family uses, the Arkansas Supreme Court ignored Pfei-
fer, took note that more than twenty neighbors protested, and re-
versed the chancellor 2 47 Denial of the request to rezone might have
been a mistake - not because of the Pfeifer rule, not because the
neighbors protested, but simply because the area may have
changed to the point that rezoning was appropriate. Nonetheless,
it seemed to cause grief at the court, and the mistake was acknowl-
edged in City of Little Rock v. Andres,14 some eleven years later.
This again involved property on Broadway, about eight blocks fur-
ther from the central business district than the property in Con-
nerly. Noting that no property owners had "intervened" (i.e., pro-
tested), the court concluded that it "appears that we made a
245. 221 Ark. 252, 253 S.W.2d 347 (1952). This involved a continuing dispute first
manifested in the supreme court in City of Little Rock v. Evans, 213 Ark. 522, 212 S.W.2d
28 (1948), in which the landowner's suit to enjoin the city from enforcing a zoning ordinance
was held to be premature for the reason that Evans had not exhausted his administrative
remedies.
246. 222 Ark. 196, 258 S.W.2d 881 (1953).
247. The effect of protest by neighboring landowners was the subject of an article by
Professor Morton Gitelman. Gitelman, The Role of the Neighbors in Zoning Cases, 28 ARK.
L. REV. 221 (1974). Clearly, protest, or the lack thereof, is an influencing factor in rezoning
applications, as the author of the instant article can attest from his service over the past two
years on the Little Rock Planning Commission. Properly, however, the decision to rezone
should not be predicated on whether the neighbors oppose, support, or are indifferent to the
requested rezoning. There is some value in hearing from the neighbors on certain occasions
in that the neighbors sometimes produce information which is not contained in the report of
the Planning Staff and should be taken into account in considering the rezoning. Moreover,
the hearing before the Planning Commission sometimes leads to reconciliation of the issues
between the developer and the neighbors or concessions on the part of the developer which
make the rezoning request more palatable to the neighbors. Even then, the final decision
should be reached on the basis of whether the rezoning proposal is reasonable based upon
conditions in the area and what effect it will have on the plan for the area involved..
248. 237 Ark. 658, 375 S.W.2d 370 (1964).
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mistake" in Connerly.24e The same reasoning was followed in City
of Little Rock v. Gardner,250 also allowing rezoning of property on
Broadway from multi-family to commercial.
The Blytheville "crosstown" area was, like Broadway in Little
Rock, a point of contention over the Pfeifer rule. Pfeifer was ap-
plied in City of Blytheville v. Lewis5 1 but not in Gammill v. City
of Blytheville252 The Gammill property was across the street from
that involved in Lewis, but in denying the appellants' request to
build a gasoline station across the street from the "Kream Kastle"
drive-in that existed due to Lewis, the Arkansas Supreme Court
decided to draw the commercial zoning line at Walnut Street,
which divided the service station property and the Kream Kastle.
The court felt that the residential district across from the Kream
Kastle was advancing rather than deteriorating "in the face of an
advancing commercial district.
'25 3
Nonetheless, the Pfeifer dogma lived on in cases decided in
1960 and 1965.25" The retreat from Pfeifer began in 1966 in Downs
249. Id. at 659, 375 S.W.2d at 371-72. The court emphasized that in Connerly, twenty
property owners had protested the change while in Andres, no neighbors had "intervened."
That is relevant only if you indulge in the presumption that because no one objected the
application must have been proper. It fails to take into account several other factors which
can lead to non-protest: (a) the developer convinces the people in the area that his project
will not be harmful and will enhance their property values (which may or may not be the
case, and in either event, does not deal with the question of whether his development will be
compatible with the plan for the area or with existing land uses); (b) the neighbors do not
feel that their protests would avail them anything because the developer is prominent and
wealthy and they are not or because they feel that city government is in the hands of the
"fat cats" anyway and that the planning commission is so oriented; (c) the neighbors have to
work and cannot appear at one or more afternoon meetings of the commission; (d) the
neighbors do not understand the notice or the procedure and do not realize that they have
any effective recourse; or (e) the developer or petitioner for the rezoning is himself a neigh-
bor who is a "good guy" and it would not be "nice" or neighborly to object. Even aside from
considering why neighbors might not protest for reasons other than that they do not oppose
the project, and the fact that there are at times valid reasons for non-protest which have
nothing to do with the proposal itself, it remains that protest, or the lack thereof, has no
legal significance in regard to what the planning commission and the city governing body
may actually do, or, with the execution of their statutory duties.
250. 239 Ark. 54, 386 S.W.2d 923 (1965). This was in the same area as the property
involved in Andres, and that case was regarded as controlling.
251. 218 Ark. 83, 234 S.W.2d 374 (1950).
252. 226 Ark. 572, 291 S.W.2d 503 (1956).
253. Id. at 574, 291 S.W.2d at 505.
254. City of Little Rock v. McKenzie, 239 Ark. 9, 386 S.W.2d 697 (1965); Economy
Wholesale Co. v. Rogers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583 (1960). Of course, the Andres case,
decided in 1964, and the Gardner case also adhere to Pfeifer, as we have seen.
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v. City of Little Rock 5 5 and, more particularly, in City of Little
Rock v. Parker." In reversing a chancellor who had declined to
sustain the city in denying rezoning from residential to commer-
cial, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
It is apparent that the passage of Act 186 of 1957, to some degree,
necessarily modified our holding in Pfeifer, for a strict and literal
interpretation of all the language in that case would certainly re-
sult in nullifying the effort by a city to coordinate development of
lands, and, more than that, in effect, would nullify Act 186." "
This opinion by Chief Justice Carleton Harris recognized that
Pfeifer was decided under the original zoning statute of 1924 which
was far more limited than the 1957 act providing for comprehen-
sive zoning. No one reading Act 186 could logically conclude that
Pfeifer met the legislative requirement of coordinated development
based upon a comprehensive plan. Even Parker hedged somewhat
by stating that "we are not saying that the city would not be acting
arbitrarily in refusing to rezone these properties to any type of
business property.'2
Pfeifer, however, was not without durability. It was blindly
adhered to in City of Helena v. Barrow,25" which was decided in
the same year as the Parker case. Between 1966 and 1974, the only
case to reject application of the Pfeifer doctrine was Fields v. City
of Little Rock."* Pfeifer was followed in cases decided in 1971,
1972, and 1973.61 By 1973, however, there was language in City of
255. 240 Ark. 623, 401 S.W.2d 210 (1966). The court stated: "If this property were
rezoned, where would the rezoning end? If these two lots are to be placed in a different
category than 'B' Residential District, why should not the lot just north of Lot 12 be placed
in the same category-and so on ad infinitum?" Id. at 628, 401 S.W.2d at 212.
256. 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921 (1966).
257. Id. at 388, 407 S.W.2d at 924.
258. Id. at 389, 407 S.W.2d at 925.
259. 241 Ark. 654, 408 S.W.2d 867 (1966).
260. 251 Ark. 811, 475 S.W.2d 509 (1972). The court in Fields relied on the language
of City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921 (1966). It was conceded by
the landowners that a literal interpretation of the Pfeifer rule was no longer proper as a
result of Parker.
261. City of Blytheville v. Thompson, 254 Ark. 46, 491 S.W.2d 769 (1973); Metropoli-
tan Trust Co. v. City of North Little Rock, 252 Ark. 1140, 482 S.W.2d 613 (1972); City of
West Helena v. Davidson, 250 Ark. 257, 464 S.W.2d 581 (1971). Heavy traffic was often
viewed as supportive of invocation of the Pfeifer rule. This was true in Metropolitan Trust
and Davidson. It was also a major factor in the following cases: City of Little Rock v. Gard-
ner, 239 Ark. 54, 386 S.W.2d 923 (1965); City of Little Rock v. Andres, 237 Ark. 658, 375
S.W.2d 370 (1964); Economy Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Rodgers, 232 Ark. 835, 340 S.W.2d 583
(1960). In Lindsey v. City of Fayetteville, 256 Ark. 352, 358, 507 S.W.2d 101, 105 (1974), the
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Paragould v. Cooper2s' which suggested that in an appropriate case
the Arkansas Supreme Court might reconsider the Pfeifer rule."
Lindsey v. City of Fayetteville,24 decided in 1974, distin-
guished two prior Pfeifer-type cases on the basis that the involved
area was not an established business district."' However, the
Lindsey tract was surrounded on two of its sides by commercial
uses and light industry and there was a heavy traffic flow at the
intersection where the land was located."' There would seem to be
an implicit suggestion that the literal implications of Pfeifer would
no longer be applied.
The implications of the Lindsey case, joined with a 4-3 split
decision in the 1973 case of City of Blytheville v. Thompson,'7
perhaps made it inevitable that a reevaluation of Pfeifer was at
hand. This took place in Baldridge v. City of North Little Rock'"
in 1975. Relying on the Parker case and ignoring a number of
other cases, the court limited and largely gutted Pfeifer in this
manner:
We are, therefore, of the opinion that residentially zoned prop-
erty which happens to be adjacent to business zoned property is
not automatically entitled to rezoning as business property as a
matter of law under Pfeifer. To hold otherwise would be illogical
and could easily defeat the entire purpose of municipal zoning, in
that a string of business establishments could be driven through
any residential neighborhood by the simple process of touching
each other. Such is not the intent of the zoning laws and such is
not the intent of the so-called "Pfeifer Rule".
Since our decision in Pfeifer we have attempted to point out
in other cases that the "Pfeifer Rule" does not apply with equal
force and rigidity to each and every case regardless of the location
court stated that while traffic should be considered, excess traffic alone is insufficient to
justify rezoning.
262. 254 Ark. 151, 492 S.W.2d 243 (1973).
263. The court stated that it did not regard that case as appropriate "for a re-exami-
nation of Pfeifer, because the area south of Highway 25 was certainly not an expanding
commercial district when the appellees sought rezoning." 254 Ark. at 154, 492 S.W.2d at
244.
264. 256 Ark. 352, 507 S.W.2d 101 (1974).
265. Id. at 355, 507 S.W.2d at 103 (distinguishing Metropolitan Trust Co. v. City of
North Little Rock, 252 Ark. 1140, 482 S.W.2d 613 (1972), and City of North Little Rock v.
McKenzie, 239 Ark. 9, 386 S.W.2d 697 (1965)).
266. Id. at 353-54, 507 S.W.2d at 102.
267. 254 Ark. 46, 491 S.W.2d 769 (1973).
268. 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975).
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of the property or the direction of business expansion.2 69
The Arkansas Supreme Court would have done better simply
to have repudiated the Pfeifer rule as an anachronism resulting
from earlier zoning statutes. Its statement that the matter-of-right
expansion of existing businesses was not the intent of the zoning
laws was clearly correct, but its statement that this was also not
the intent of the Pfeifer rule obviously lent some undeserving re-
spectability to Pfeifer. The court sought to distinguish the fact sit-
uation in Baldridge from two recent cases which had followed Pfei-
fer.2 70 But it ignored the 4-3 decision in Thompson as well as
applications of Pfeifer since the Parker decision.7 1
By the time of Baldridge, the Pfeifer rule had been under at-
tack for several years from various sources. 7  In defense of it, anal-
ogies might be drawn to cases involving the refusal of equity to
enforce restrictive covenants in areas which had so drastically
changed as to render the enforcement unjust,2 73 or to the doctrine
of ameliorating waste.2 74 But those situations involve extreme cir-
cumstances which, by analogy to zoning, would render a refusal to
rezone arbitrary. The Pfeifer rule was therefore not an analogous
application of such circumstances to zoning law but a parody of
such situations.
269. Id. at 252, 523 S.W.2d at 915.
270. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. City of North Little Rock, 252 Ark. 1140, 482 S.W.2d
613 (1972); City of West Helena v. Davidson, 250 Ark. 257, 464 S.W.2d 581 (1971).
271. City of Blytheville v. Thompson, 254 Ark. 46, 491 S.W.2d 769 (1973); City of
Helena v. Barrow, 241 Ark. 654, 408 S.W.2d 867 (1966).
272. Aside from some members of the court itself, the prime attackers (in writing)
were Professor Gitelman in his article, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 ARK. L.
Rv. 22 (1969), and the author of a Note, 28 ARK. L. REv. 262 (1974).
273. See City of Little Rock v. Joyner, 212 Ark. 508, 206 S.W.2d 446 (1947). Unfortu-
nately, the validity of applying this rule in the Joyner case is colored by interlocking that
fact situation with the Pfeifer rule. The Joyner case, when so colored, becomes a questiona-
ble precedent for the "change of conditions" rule. But see Storthz v. Midland Hills Land
Co., 192 Ark. 273, 90 S.W.2d 772 (1936). The requisite for applying the rule on change of
conditions is that the change must be "so radical as to practically destroy the essential
objectives and purposes of the agreement." Inabinet v. Booe, 262 S.C. 81, 84, 202 S.E.2d 643,
645 (1974). See also Murphey v. Gray, 84 Ariz. 299, 327 P.2d 751 (1958); Paschen v.
Pashkow, 63 IlM. App. 2d 56, 211 N.E.2d 576 (1965); Eliers v. Alewel, 393 S.W.2d 584 (Mo.
1965). To the contrary of the reasoning in Joyner, on encroachment by the business district,
see West Alameda Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 169 Colo. 491,
458 P.2d 253 (1969); Redfern Lawns Civic Ass'n v. Currie Pontiac Co., 328 Mich. 463, 44
N.W.2d 8 (1950); Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 312 S.W.2d 943 (1958). Joyner voices
the "change of conditions" rule, but it is a victim of the Pfeifer philosophy and thus is
bastardized as a precedent.
274. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899) is the leading case.
ZONING LAW
Baldridge, despite its failure to pronounce the outright demise
of Pfeifer, should have been adequate to lay the rule to rest. Per-
haps the reason it did not was that despite the Parker case, the
Pfeifer rule had been applied in a number of cases. To lawyers
finding Pfeifer useful, there remained some hope that it might only
be dying and had not yet passed away. These hopes were dashed
further by the court in City of Conway v. Housing Authority275 in
1979. The property involved there was multi-family residential
land bounded on three sides by a "highway service" zone and on
one side by a business district. Obviously, the property should
have been rezoned commercial, but the city refused. The chancery
court reversed the city and assigned a commercial classification
which was the same as the highway service zone. The Arkansas Su-
preme Court's opinion in Conway deals in large measure with the
fact that the role of the chancellor is to determine whether the city
acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner. In essence, al-
though the court does not say so explicitly, the chancery court de-
termines the question of unreasonableness of the municipal action,
but it does not then determine the appropriate classification. This
is in line with earlier scholarly criticism.2 76 In the process of modi-
fying the chancellor in that regard while affirming his obvious con-
clusion that the municipal authorities acted arbitrarily, the court
made it clear that it was not applying the Pfeifer rule:
Residential property which is adjacent to business zoned
property is not automatically entitled to rezoning as business
property. This is so even though the highest and best use of the
property might be other than residential. To allow such rule
would be to violate the zoning act itself. If we were to allow any
property abutting business property to be rezoned as business
property, there would be no need of a zoning ordinance in the
first place. We have stated too many times to mention that the
court should sustain the city's action in zoning matters unless it is
found that the municipality was arbitrary in setting up the
ordinance.27 7
In support of that proposition, the court cited Baldridge. But
the statement of the court is, if not dictum, only borderline lan-
275. 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).
276. Gitelman, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 ARK. L. REV. 22, 36-40
(1969). See Olsen v. City of Little Rock, 241 Ark. 155, 406 S.W.2d 706 (1966) (an example of
judicial rezoning).
277. City of Conway v. Housing Auth., 266 Ark. 404, 409, 584 S.W.2d 10, 13 (1979).
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guage when utilized in connection with the basic issue of the case.
After stating the facts, the city's case could easily have been re-
jected in one paragraph since it was obviously an arbitrary, unrea-
sonable decision by the city which was further tainted by apparent
considerations of self-interest on the part of the municipality."7 8
What the court did was to go out of its way to reaffirm the
sound principle of Baldridge. In so doing it sought once again to
rid itself of the Pfeifer spectre without saying so unequivocably. In
reality, the Pfeifer rule is dead; but also in reality it is not buried.
Lawyers and chancellors alike continue to invoke it.279 Planning
and zoning in Arkansas owe a great deal to the Arkansas Supreme
Court for its decisions in Parker, Baldridge, and Conway. But in
the spirit of judicial cleanliness, the court should simply state, in
an appropriate case: "The Pfeifer rule, as it has come to be known,
is no longer applicable in Arkansas. Contrary language in cases
previously decided is not expressive of the law."
V. CONCLUSION
Arkansas planning and zoning law, has in recent years, evolved
from a somewhat ad hoc posture involving a seeming lack of direc-
tion or understanding into a more predictable and understandable
approach. It is still somewhat rudimentary in the sense that Ar-
kansas zoning cases are concerned with very basic questions on
such issues as rezoning appeals, variances, and nonconforming
uses. While more sophisticated issues will likely eventuate, the Ar-
kansas cases to this time have been typical of rather basic zoning
confrontations at the local level.
As this process has taken place, the Arkansas Supreme Court
itself has evolved to the point of greater understanding of the basic
278. The Arkansas Supreme Court, per Justice Purtle, stated: "It is obvious [that] the
city of Conway wants to obtain title to this particular property and thereafter reclassify it
either as B-1 or B-3." Id. at 410, 584 S.W.2d at 13. Yet the city had refused to rezone the
property B-3 as requested by the Housing Authority. The city had offered to buy the prop-
erty for the amount of indebtedness against it.
279. Breeding v. City of Little Rock, No. 79-2520 (Pulaski Chancery Court, 1980).
Both the attorney for the applicant and the Chancellor relied on the Pfeifer rule even
though the property is in an area to which the rule, during its full flowering, would not
apply since the area is not in the path of commercial expansion. Despite this fact, the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals, in a 4-2 and singularly unfortunate opinion, sustained the findings
of the Chancellor and thereby undercut and eroded the law as stated by the Arkansas Su-
preme Court. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 270 Ark. 752, 606 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980).
For the correct statement of the law on the subject, see the minority opinion by Judge
David Newbern. On November 17, 1980, the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted review.
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precepts of planning and zoning law. Recent cases have illustrated
the court's understanding that although the property rights of an
individual are not and never were immune from the rights of the
public in general, controls on the property rights of a single indi-
vidual may serve to preserve and protect the property rights of
many individuals. Viewed in this way, zoning does not seem so
much to be a bureaucratic intervention into the rights of a particu-
lar landowner as a public protection of the property rights of citi-
zens in general. The very first of the legal maxims is "Salus Populi
est suprema Lex"-regard for the public welfare is the highest
law. 80 That maxim was attributed to Francis Bacon; 8' 1 but even
his old adversary, Coke, 82 the great exponent of the common law,
would concede that implicit in judge-made law is its ability to
adapt to new times and new conditions. 83 This has been the great-
ness of the common law, at once its living essence, its roots, its
maturation, its harvest.
28
280. H. BROOM, LEA MAxims 1 (10th ed. 1939).
281. Id.
282. Sir Edward Coke lived in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. His
life was the subject of the book, C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE (1956). For an exten-
sive evaluation, see 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 523-93 (2d ed. 1937).
283. See generally Leflar, Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 319 (1971)
and Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 321 (1974). In the latter article,
Professor Leflar states:
The common law system could not have survived through the centuries if it had
been no more than a method of perpetuating its own past. It has survived and is
healthy today because in the hands of wise judges it is a system that calls for
growth, one that builds on the past to meet the needs of the present and the
future. The system will not tolerate hog-wild innovation, but without innovation,
it will die-it would have died long ago. Legislatures can aid the courts in updat-
ing the law, but much of the ultimate responsibility rests upon our appellate
courts and, specifically, upon the judges who sit on those courts.
Id. at 346.
284. The law fosters change. It promotes orderly acclimation to the effects of
change. This is implicit in American legal order from the early days of the Repub-
lic when the essential nature of federalism, dual sovereignty and the relative posi-
tions of institutions in our legal system were being determined on down to the
present time. Law in America, when broadly viewed, could never be equated with
the status quo or with vested interests or inflexible bastions of settled power.
The fact of change, and the inescapable truth that ever-continuing change is the
certainty with which the law must reckon in providing a collateral social stability
in the midst of existing newness, is the central theme of American law. Law's
conservatism, in the real and best sense of the word, has been manifested in its
ability to accomplish the purpose of assimilating change into the broader fabric of
our life and institutions without disturbing the basic framework or upsetting the
momentum.
R. WIor, THE LAw OF AIRSPACE 277 (1968). See also 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 387-88,
428-29 (1959).

